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Shareholder Derivative Litigation’s Historical 
and Normative Foundations 
ANN M. SCARLETT†  
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Marshall described a corporation as “an 
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in [a] 
contemplation of law.”1 While it is easy to imagine the 
purposes for which an individual may act, the artificial 
nature of a corporation makes it difficult to know the 
purposes for which a corporation acts or should act. 
Scholars, judges, and politicians have long debated the 
proper purpose of a corporation. Does a corporation exist for 
the benefit of its shareholders, its managers, its employees, 
its customers, the public at large, or some combination of 
these groups? That question directly impacts the allocation 
of power within a corporation. Should directors and officers 
have complete authority to control the corporation? Should 
shareholders, employees, or the public have the ability to 
challenge the decisions made by the corporation’s directors 
and officers? If so, how and when can they bring such 
challenges?  
These questions have been intensely debated as the 
United States experienced a series of corporate scandals 
during the first decade of the 21st century. The scandals 
began with Enron and WorldCom in 2001, followed by the 
backdating of stock options scandals at numerous 
corporations during the middle of the decade, and concluded 
with the numerous scandals related to subprime mortgages 
at the end of the decade. In response to these events, new 
  
† Professor of Law, Saint Louis University. I thank Jane Gayou, Sarah Larson, 
and Justin Mulligan for their exceptional research assistance. This article was 
supported by a sabbatical research grant from Saint Louis University. 
 1. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). 
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statutes and regulations were imposed on corporations.2 In 
addition, various methods for increasing shareholder power 
relative to the board of directors have been proposed by 
shareholder primacy advocates, who believe that the 
corporation is owned by its shareholders and also that the 
board of directors must act for the purpose of maximizing 
shareholder wealth.3 Shareholder primacy advocates’ 
proposals have gained traction. For instance, when 
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act in 2010, it specifically included a 
provision giving the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) the authority to grant shareholders proxy access to 
nominate directors.4 The SEC did adopt a rule to give 
shareholders the power to nominate directors for election, 
but the rule was later struck down on judicial review.5 
Dodd-Frank also included provisions giving shareholders a 
say on pay with the right to non-binding votes on executive 
pay and golden parachutes6 and a provision requiring a 
corporation to disclose in its proxy statement the 
  
 2. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the U.S.C.); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 
Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). 
 3. See, e.g., A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 1049, 1049 (1931); Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business 
Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32 (arguing that, 
because shareholders own the corporation, the corporation’s responsibility is to 
increase profits); see also LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER 
ON SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION 3-5 (2011) (describing 
shareholders’ efforts to increase their power over corporate affairs and the 
resulting alteration of the corporate governance landscape); William T. Allen, 
Our Schrizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 
261, 264-66 (1992) (describing theories of corporate purpose); Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 
840 (2005) (arguing “shareholders should have the power to adopt charter 
provisions that would permit them subsequently to intervene in specific 
business decisions”). 
 4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 971. 
 5. SEC Rule 14a-11 required a corporation to include certain shareholder 
nominated directors in its proxy statement, but it was struck down in Bus. 
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951. 
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relationship between executive compensation and company 
performance. 7  
Other scholars have intensely argued against such 
proposals and the shareholder primacy theory of the 
corporation. Good arguments have also been made that at 
least some of the recent corporate scandals were caused by 
directors and officers seeking to maximize shareholder 
wealth, by raising stock prices to the detriment of all else.8 
A competing corporate model is the director primacy theory, 
which argues that the power to make corporate decisions is 
vested solely in the board of directors and the board serves 
“as the nexus of the various contracts making up the 
corporation.”9 While rejecting the shareholder primacy 
theory, the director primacy theory embraces the same 
shareholder wealth maximization purpose of the board of 
directors.10 The team production theory also views the board 
as having the power to make the corporation’s decisions, but 
argues that directors and officers must “mediat[e] the 
various and often conflicting interests of shareholders” and 
the interests of “customers, suppliers, employees, and other 
stakeholders whose specific investments contribute to the 
firm’s success.”11 The stakeholder or managerialist model 
views the corporation as a social institution in which the   
 7. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 953. 
 8. LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 22 (2012) (stating that 
Enron’s “managers and employees were famous for their fixation on raising 
stock price”); E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance 
and the Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 441-42 
(2003) (stating the Enron and WorldCom scandals revealed that “(1) officers ran 
amok, wallowing in greed-driven schemes and other abuses; and (2) directors 
allowed it to happen, tolerating officers who were managing to the market while 
they contented the directors with ever-rising stock prices”). 
 9. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 605 (2003). 
 10. Id. at 551. 
 11. STOUT, supra note 8, at 110-11 (quoting Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism 
About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 564 (2006)); see also 
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, 253-54 (1999) (arguing that the board of directors acts 
as a “mediating hierarchy” among the corporation’s team-specific assets 
invested by shareholders, managers, and employees, and rejecting the sole 
pursuit of shareholder wealth maximization). 
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board’s duties extend beyond assuring investors a fair 
return and includes some duty to all those affected by the 
corporation, such as employees, suppliers, customers, and 
the public.12  
This debate over corporate purpose is not new. It raged 
in the first half of the 20th century with the proliferation of 
public corporations, in which many investors could purchase 
shares in corporations on a public stock exchange but play 
no active role in the management of those corporations.13 
Before the early 1900s, most corporations were privately 
owned by a small group of shareholders who typically 
participated in managing the corporation.14 But even then, 
courts struggled with the question of corporate purpose 
within these private companies as shareholders sought to 
challenge the actions of directors through litigation. The 
shareholder derivative lawsuit is an important part of the 
debate about corporate purpose because, through such 
lawsuits, shareholders seek to hold directors accountable for 
their decisions. Yet scholars in the modern debate over 
corporate purpose have ignored its historical origins as 
reflected in shareholder litigation prior to the 20th century. 
Almost all scholarship that even briefly mentions early 
shareholder derivative lawsuits in the United States relies 
solely upon a 15-page paper by Professor Bert Prunty 
published in 1957.15 This Article seeks to remedy this gap in 
the literature by more fully examining English and U.S. law 
  
 12. E.g., Allen, supra note 3, at 264-66; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are 
Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1145-46 (1932). 
 13. Professors Berle and Means famously described the dangers inherent in 
the structural separation of passive ownership from the active management of 
the corporation. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY xxx-xxxv (rev. ed. 1967) (1932). 
 14. Id. at 4; Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Evolution of the Modern Corporation: 
Corporate Governance Reform in Context, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) 
(manuscript at 10), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2136044. 
 15. Bert S. Prunty, Jr., The Shareholders’ Derivative Suit: Notes on Its 
Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980 (1957); see, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., 
Shareholder Litigation: The Accidental Elegance of Aronson v. Lewis, in THE 
ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 165, 167 n.4 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 2008) 
(noting the article draws from Professor Prunty’s work); see also Ross v. 
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 n.3 (1970) (citing Professor Prunty’s work). 
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on the shareholder derivative action to understand its true 
historical and normative foundations.  
The shareholder derivative action is a form of 
representative litigation long recognized by courts in the 
United States, as is the class action. These are 
representative actions because one or a few persons stand 
for another or group of persons.16 Today it is commonly said 
that the plaintiff in a class action represents the other class 
members,17 while the plaintiff in a shareholder derivative 
action brings suit on behalf of the corporation.18 A modern 
shareholder can potentially pursue litigation of either type 
depending on the nature of the claim asserted. A 
shareholder’s action is derivative when it is based on an 
injury to the corporation, such as a claim for monetary 
damages based on corporate mismanagement.19 A 
shareholder may also pursue a direct action in his own 
name, or as a class action on behalf of himself and other 
shareholders, when the claim is based upon a personal right 
  
 16. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1417 (9th ed. 2009). Representative actions also 
include those in which a person is designated to represent another, such as a 
guardian appointed to represent a child or an executor appointed to represent 
the estate of a deceased person. See id. 
 17. E.g., ROBERT H. KLONOFF, CLASS ACTIONS AND OTHER MULTI-PARTY 
LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 17 (4th ed. 2012). A defendant class is also possible, 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), but is extremely rare in modern litigation. CIGNA 
Healthcare of St. Louis v. Kaiser, 294 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2002) (calling 
defendant classes “rare birds”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: 
Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 370, 388 (2000) (stating “[d]efendant class actions are as rare as unicorns”). 
 18. See, e.g., Rivers v. Wachovia Corp., 665 F.3d 610, 614 (4th Cir. 2011); 
Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1264 (Del. 2012); Boland v. 
Boland, 31 A.3d 529, 541-42 (Md. 2011). 
 19. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, § 8.2, at 363 
(2002); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 509 (defining a derivative 
action as “[a] suit by a beneficiary of a fiduciary to enforce a right belonging to 
the fiduciary; esp., a suit asserted by a shareholder on the corporation’s behalf 
against a third party (usu. a corporate officer) because of the corporation’s 
failure to take some action against the third party”). 
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belonging to the shareholders, such as a claim regarding 
shareholder voting rights.20  
Commentators have frequently stated that the United 
States imported the shareholder derivative action from 
England.21 However, that is not entirely accurate. What the 
United States imported from the English Court of Chancery 
was the necessary parties rule and exceptions to that rule. 
Part I of this Article will examine the historical and 
normative foundations of both class actions and shareholder 
derivative actions in the English Court of Chancery during 
the 1700s and early 1800s. Early representative litigation in 
the English Court of Chancery reveals examples of group 
litigation that are comparable to today’s class actions. It 
also reveals that similar actions involving shareholders 
were recognized by the English Chancery Court, but such 
actions were greatly limited.  
Part II will then compare the English precedents to the 
first instances and the evolution of class actions and 
shareholder derivative actions in the United States during 
the 1800s. Before the American Revolution, corporate law 
and shareholder litigation in the colonies followed English 
precedents.22 However, U.S. law began to diverge soon after 
the United States won its independence from England. 
During the 1800s, U.S. courts recognized an exception to the 
necessary parties rule that permitted representative   
 20. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 19, § 8.2, at 362-64 (contrasting direct 
shareholder suits from derivative shareholder litigation); BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 16, at 509. 
 21. See, e.g., Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331, 341, 347 (1855) (noting 
that the equity jurisdiction of U.S. courts is the same as in England from which 
it was derived and holding that courts of equity have jurisdiction over 
corporations in claims brought by their shareholders); Nicholas Calcina Howson, 
When “Good” Corporate Governance Makes “Bad” (Financial) Firms: The Global 
Crisis and the Limits of Private Law, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 44, 
47 (2009), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/108/howson.pdf 
(describing derivative actions as “imported into U.S. state corporate law from 
England”). 
 22. See Bank of the U. S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 88 (1809) (“[O]ur 
ideas of a corporation, its privileges and its disabilities, are derived entirely 
from the English books, we resort to them for aid, in ascertaining its 
character.”); see also Howson, supra note 21, at 47 (noting the shareholder 
derivative action was imported into U.S. state law from England). 
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lawsuits, but the contours of these actions differed 
significantly from such actions in England. Today, these 
lawsuits would be classified as class actions and 
shareholder derivative actions in the United States. The 
Part will demonstrate that the historical and normative 
foundations of the U.S. shareholder derivative action 
differed significantly from that of England, and that the 
shareholder derivative action is more closely related to the 
class action than is commonly recognized.  
The shared history of these two forms of representative 
litigation has long been overlooked, but it reveals the early 
normative justifications for shareholder litigation. For the 
United States’ first 150 years, shareholders were permitted 
to bring lawsuits on behalf of themselves and all other 
shareholders in certain circumstances, similar to class 
actions. That formulation did not change until the late 
1940s, when courts began to regularly describe such 
lawsuits as being brought on behalf of the corporation. Part 
III will examine this shift in the normative foundations of 
U.S. shareholder derivative litigation and explore the 
possible explanations for the variances. It will also examine 
the changes in the limitations on when shareholders can 
bring derivative actions. The historical and normative 
foundations of shareholder derivative litigation offer 
potential insights for the current debate on shareholder 
power and corporate purpose. 
I. REPRESENTATIVE LITIGATION IN THE  
ENGLISH COURT OF CHANCERY 
Examples of representative litigation are found in the 
“earliest days of English law.”23 The history of group 
litigation developed gradually from communal harms within 
English feudal society during the 12th to 15th centuries.24 
  
 23. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 832 (1999). 
 24. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN 
CLASS ACTION 268-77 (1987) (noting that group litigation developing from 
communal harms “generated no theory [or] legal doctrine”); see also Raymond B. 
Marcin, Searching for the Origin of the Class Action, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 515, 
517–24 (1974). 
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The earliest published examples of group litigation date 
from the 16th century and fall into two main categories: 
manorial conflicts between landlords and tenants, and 
parochial conflicts between villagers and parsons.25  
The 1681 case of How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove26 is an 
example of group litigation involving manorial conflicts. The 
lord of a manor sued his tenants claiming a grant of “free 
warren,” which is the right to kill small game.27 The English 
Court of Chancery held that the case was proper in equity 
because it was essentially a bill of peace and its 
maintenance would avoid multiplicity of suits.28  
An example of a parochial conflict, as well as an 
example of the binding nature of group litigation, is Brown 
v. Vermuden29 from 1676, in which a vicar sued the miners 
of his parish to enforce his customary right to purchase a 
tenth of their ore.30 In an earlier case brought by the vicar’s 
predecessor, the miners chose four persons to defend the 
suit for them, and the case was decided in favor of the 
vicar’s predecessor.31 In the current case, a miner named 
Vermuden insisted that he was not bound by the previous 
decree, because he was not a party to it.32 The Chancery 
Court dismissed this argument stating that “[i]f the 
Defendant should not be bound, Suits of this Nature . . . 
would be infinite, and impossible to be ended.”33  
Every group litigation case decided during the 16th and 
17th centuries involved these two types of conflicts, 
manorial or parochial, between members of agricultural 
  
 25. Stephen C. Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a 
History of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 867 (1977). 
 26. How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, (1681) 23 Eng. Rep. 277 (Ch.); 1 Vern. 22.  
 27. Id. at 277, 1 Vern. at 22.  
 28. Id. 
 29. Brown v. Vermuden, (1676) 22 Eng. Rep. 796; 1 Chan. Cas. 272.  
 30. Id. at 796, 1 Chan. Cas. at 272. 
 31. Id. at 796-97, 1 Chan. Cas. at 272. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 797, 1 Chan. Cas. at 272. 
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communities.34 These litigation groups, which could involve 
either plaintiffs or defendants,35 represented shared 
identical interests, and their members consented to 
representation by the named parties.36  
A. Transition to Class Litigation in the English Court of 
Chancery 
Group litigation began to transition to class litigation 
during the 18th century.37 Group litigation relied on the 
representative authority conferred by preexisting groups of 
villagers or parishioners,38 whereas more commercially-
connected groups such as proprietors and shareholders 
began to seek recognition as litigative entities in the 18th 
century.39 During this century, the English Chancery Court 
created the necessary parties rule or proper parties rule,40 
which required the joinder of all parties interested in the 
matter so that a final resolution could be made.41 As with 
any rule, the Chancery Court soon recognized exceptions to 
the necessary parties rule. In its creation of exceptions, the 
Chancery Court increasingly set aside the idea of consent 
and instead relied on shared interest of the group as the key 
for representation, although the precise degree of 
  
 34. Yeazell, supra note 25, at 872. 
 35. Id. at 880. 
 36. YEAZELL, supra note 24, at 175-76; see also Cutting v. Gilbert, 6 F. Cas. 
1079, 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1865) (stating the medieval manorial cases involved “a 
community of interest growing out of the nature and condition of the right in 
dispute”). In terms of jurisdiction, the Chancery Court heard most of these cases 
from the 16th century and almost all such cases during the 17th century. 
YEAZELL, supra note 24, at 125. 
 37. Id. at 165-66. 
 38. See id. at 162-64; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., et al., An Historical 
Analysis of the Binding Effect of Class Suits, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1861-63 
(1998); Graham C. Lilly, Modeling Class Actions: The Representative Suits as an 
Analytic Tool, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1008, 1013-14 (2003). 
 39. YEAZELL, supra note 24, at 176. 
 40. For simplicity, this Article will refer to the rule as the necessary parties 
rule although it may also properly be referred to as the proper parties rule. 
 41. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of 
a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1254, 1255-56, 1262-70 (1961). 
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organization required for a finding of shared interest 
varied.42 An English court in 1901 summarized the Court of 
Chancery’s necessary parties rule as follows: 
The old rule in the Court of Chancery was very simple and 
perfectly well understood. Under the old practice the Court 
required the presence of all parties interested in the matter in 
suit, in order that a final end might be made of the controversy. 
But when the parties were so numerous that you could never 
“come at justice”, to use an expression in one of the older cases, if 
everybody interested was made a party, the rule was not allowed 
to stand in the way. It was originally a rule of convenience: for the 
sake of convenience it was relaxed. Given a common interest and 
a common grievance, a representative suit was in order if the 
relief sought was in its nature beneficial to all whom the plaintiff 
proposed to represent.43 
As more simply stated later by the English Supreme Court’s 
procedural rules: “Where there are numerous persons 
having the same interest in one cause or matter, one or 
more of such persons may sue . . . on behalf of or for the 
benefit of all persons so interested.”44 
As examples of the application of the necessary parties 
rule and its exceptions to class actions, consider the 
following two cases involving similar factual scenarios. In 
the 1751 case of Leigh v. Thomas,45 the Chancery Court 
sustained a demurrer (similar to a modern motion to 
dismiss) for want of parties when part of a ship’s crew 
appointed two members as their agents. The plaintiffs sued 
for prize money for which they claimed entitlement under 
the general articles of the ship, which stated the crew had 
  
 42. YEAZELL, supra note 24, at 277. 
 43. Bedford v. Ellis, [1901] A.C. 1 (H.L.) 8 (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding 
that the necessary parties rule was not limited to persons having a beneficial 
proprietary interest) (U.K.). 
 44. Smith v. Cardiff Corp., [1954] 1 Q.B. 210 at 214-15 (Eng.) (quoting Rules 
of the Supreme Court Ord 16, r 9 (Eng.)). In this case, four tenants sued “on 
behalf of themselves and all other tenants” to challenge their landlords’ decision 
to increase rests on a differential basis according to the tenants’ incomes; the 
court held it was not a proper representative action because there was no class 
of persons “having the same interest” but rather two classes with conflicting 
interests since affluent tenants subsidize the others. Id. at 212, 220-22. 
 45. Leigh v. Thomas, (1751) 28 Eng. Rep. 201 (Ch.); 2 Ves. Sen. 312.  
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liberty to appoint two agents.46 The two agents filing this 
lawsuit were appointed by an agreement signed by 64 
members of the 80-person crew.47 “They brought this bill 
therefore, not on behalf of the whole crew,” but on behalf of 
themselves and those 64 members.48 Against the demurrer, 
the plaintiffs cited several cases where all persons 
interested were not made parties “from necessity.”49 The 
court allowed the demurrer but suggested that the result 
might be different if the two agents had brought a bill on 
behalf of the whole crew.50 
In 1807, the captain of a privateer sued its owners for 
an account of prize money in Good v. Blewitt.51 After the 
defendants objected that all interested persons must be 
parties, the Chancery Court gave leave for the captain to 
amend his bill to state that he represented all other 
members of the crew.52 The court then expressly rejected the 
defendant’s objection with regards to joinder, declaring that 
this situation “calls peculiarly” for an exception to the 
necessary parties rule, because it would be impossible to 
locate and join all these sailors individually.53 The court also 
emphasized that the representation was occurring on the 
plaintiff’s end, and there was no greater inconvenience to 
the defendant if all the plaintiffs were joined than 
otherwise.54 
  
 46. Id. at 201, 2 Ves. Sen. at 312. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 201-02, 2 Ves. Sen. at 312-13. 
 51. Good v. Blewitt, (1807) 33 Eng. Rep. 343 (Ch.); 13 Ves. Jun. 397.  
 52. Id. at 343-45, 13 Ves. Jun. at 398-99. 
 53. Id. at 345, 13 Ves. Jun. at 401. 
 54. Id., 13 Ves. Jun. at 401-02; cf. Brown v. Harris, (1807) 33 Eng. Rep. 401 
(Ch.) 403; 13 Ves. Jun. 552, 558 (allowing a bill filed by several officers on behalf 
of themselves and other soldiers to obtain prize-money). 
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B. Shareholder Actions in the English Court of Chancery 
During the 18th and 19th centuries, the English Court 
of Chancery also recognized a similar exception to the 
necessary parties rule for lawsuits involving the owners of 
businesses, and these actions can be seen as precursors to 
the modern shareholder derivative action. The cases 
involved a variety of business enterprises such as 
partnerships and joint-stock companies, as well as 
corporations. Joint-stock companies were far more prevalent 
than corporations during this time period and in some ways 
were more similar to partnerships, but the capital of joint-
stock companies were divided into transferable shares 
similar to corporations and thus had a larger number of 
investors than partnerships generally.55 In applying the 
necessary parties rule and its exceptions, however, the 
English decisions treated these business entities the same 
and recognized an exception to the necessary parties rule 
for actions by or against their owners. The exception 
recognized by these cases was similar to that for class 
actions.56 However, a few cases demonstrate that the 
development of an exception to the necessary parties rule 
for shareholder-type actions was a bumpy path, as is often 
the case with common law.  
In the 1722 case of Chancey v. May,57 the English 
Chancery Court held that part of the proprietors of an 
enterprise may bring suit without making all the 
proprietors actual parties, if they sue on behalf of 
themselves and all the proprietors.58 The treasurer and 
manager of the Temple Mills Brass-works brought suit on 
behalf of themselves and all other proprietors against the 
late treasurers and managers alleging mismanagement and 
  
 55. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 139 (3d ed. 2005); 
see also Van Sandau v. Moore, (1826) 38 Eng. Rep. 171 (Ch.) 177-79; 1 Russ. 
441, 458-63 (Lord Eldon digresses at length on the social, legal, and political 
history of the joint stock company). 
 56. See Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch.) 202-04; 2 Hare 461, 
490-95. 
 57. Chancey v. May, (1722) 24 Eng. Rep. 265; Prec. Ch. 592.  
 58. Id. at 265, Prec. Ch. at 592. 
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embezzlement.59 The defendants demurred because all the 
proprietors were not made parties and they might be 
“harassed and perplexed with multiplicity of suits.”60 The 
court denied the demurrer finding that the proprietors were 
suing “on behalf of themselves and all the others,” and so all 
the rest “were in effect parties.”61 Furthermore, the court 
stated that it would be impracticable if all were made 
parties by name and there would be “no coming of justice.”62  
By contrast, the Chancery Court did not permit an 
exception to the necessary parties rule in a similar situation 
in Moffat v. Farquharson63 in 1788. The bill was filed by the 
plaintiff, “on behalf of himself and the other part-owners of 
a ship,” for an account of the ship’s profits and particularly 
the money paid to the defendants for the appointment of a 
captain.64 The defendants demurred, arguing that all part-
owners should have been parties.65 Finding this case 
distinguishable from earlier cases “of part of the 
parishioners filing a bill for themselves and the other 
parishioners,” the court held that all the part-owners must 
be made actual parties.66 However, the reporter recognized 
that the case conflicted with later cases by noting after the 
case: “The decision here is clearly wrong.”67 
In Lloyd v. Loaring,68 three officers of the Caledonian 
Lodge of Free Masons filed a bill on behalf of all the other 
lodge members seeking the return of a chest of the chapter’s 
ceremonial items that they alleged the two defendants had 
  
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Moffat v. Farquharson, (1788) 29 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch.); 2 Bro. C.C. 338.  
 64. Id. at 129, 2 Bro. C.C. at 338. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (emphasis omitted); cf. Williams v. Farrington, (1789) 29 Eng. Rep. 
395 (Ch.) 395-96; 3 Bro. C.C. 39, 39-40 (permitting one owner to sue the captain 
of a ship on behalf of all the other part-owners). 
 68. Lloyd v. Loring, (1802) 31 Eng. Rep. 1302 (Ch.); 6 Ves. Jun. 773. 
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stolen69 The defendants demurred for want of parties 
arguing that the three plaintiffs could not file on behalf of 
themselves and all the others because the interest stated by 
the bill was joint among all the lodge members, and 
therefore the others must be joined.70 Lord Eldon allowed 
the demurrer because the plaintiffs had sued in effect as a 
corporation, which the Lodge was not.71 However, Lord 
Eldon noted that if the plaintiffs had sued as individuals 
jointly interested, on behalf of the others, alleging that it 
was “manifestly inconvenient to justice to make them all 
parties,” then the bill “might be very proper.”72 Seizing the 
hint, the plaintiffs sought leave to amend to sue as 
individuals on behalf of the other members, and Lord Eldon 
allowed the amendment.73 
In the 1805 case of Adair v. New River Company,74 Lord 
Eldon similarly recognized an exception to the necessary 
parties rule in a case involving a true corporation.75 The 
New River Company was a corporation originally created by 
King James I in return for a share of its profits; the Crown’s 
original share had subsequently been divided into many 
shares purchased by at least one hundred individuals.76 One 
of these shareholders argued that he was being mis-taxed 
(as individual shareholders were accountable for such tax), 
and that he was contributing disproportionately to the 
  
 69. Id. at 1302-03, 6 Ves. Jun. at 773-75. 
 70. Id. at 1303, 6 Ves. Jun. at 775. 
 71. Id. at 1305, 6 Ves. Jun. at 779 (Lord Eldon’s concern was the affectation 
of a “corporate character” in the bill). 
 72. Id. at 1304, 6 Ves. Jun. at 777; cf. Douglas v. Horsfall, (1825) 57 Eng. Rep. 
315 (Ch.); 2 Sim. & St. 184 (allowing demurrer because the trustees for a 
company seeking specific performance of a company lease did not join all 
members nor file the bill on behalf of the other members). 
 73. Lloyd, 31 Eng. Rep. at 1304-05, 6 Ves. Jun. at 778; cf. Small v. Atwood, 
(1832) 159 Eng. Rep. 1051 (Ch.) 1071, 1073; You. 407, 455, 459-60 (permitting a 
suit by several partners of the British Iron Company on behalf of the other 
partners, seeking to have a fraudulent contract rescinded). 
 74. Adair v. New River Co., (1805) 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch.); 11 Ves. Jun. 429. 
 75. Id. at 1159, 11 Ves. Jun. at 444. 
 76. Id. at 1153, 11 Ves. Jun. at 429. 
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company’s total tax payments.77 The shareholder sued the 
company as a corporation and joined eight individual 
shareholders, seeking the money owed him.78 The 
defendants objected for the lack of necessary parties, stating 
that all the shareholders must be joined to avoid 
multiplicity of suits and to account for differing 
circumstances among the shareholders regarding taxes 
already paid.79 The plaintiff argued, citing Lloyd v. Loaring, 
that while the necessary parties requirement is 
theoretically the rule, it does not prevail where it is 
impossible for justice to be served otherwise, such as here 
where joining all the parties was impossible.80 Although 
Lord Eldon dismissed the bill on the merits, he rejected at 
length the objection for lack of necessary parties stating 
that, while the application of the rule depends on the 
circumstances of each case, it should not be applied where 
joining all the parties is impracticable.81 
In Cockburn v. Thompson,82 the plaintiffs were 
proprietors of The Philanthropic Annuity Institution, whose 
purpose became impossible when Parliament denied the 
Institution permission to accept and grant annuities in the 
name of trustees.83 The plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves 
and all other proprietors, sued the Institution’s solicitor and 
bankers for an account of the sums received by them on 
behalf of the Institution and to have all of the plaintiffs’ 
money returned to them.84 Defendants objected that other 
proprietors existed who were not named in the bill, and that 
they must be made parties.85 Citing Chancey v. May and   
 77. Id. at 1153, 11 Ves. Jun. at 429-30. 
 78. Id. at 1153-54, 11 Ves. Jun. at 429-30. 
 79. Id. at 1154, 11 Ves. Jun. at 430. 
 80. Id., 11 Ves. Jun. at 431. 
 81. Id. at 1159, 11 Ves. Jun. at 444; see also YEAZELL, supra note 24, at 277 
(noting Lord Eldon permitted the representation of a group “entirely lack[ing] 
social cohesion,” as the members could not be identified much less contacted for 
their consent). 
 82. Cockburn v. Thompson, (1809) 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (Ch.); 16 Ves. Jun. 321. 
 83. Id. at 1005, 16 Ves. Jun. at 321-22. 
 84. Id. at 1005-06, 16 Ves. Jun. at 321-22. 
 85. Id. at 1006, 16 Ves. Jun. at 322-23. 
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Adair v. New River Company, the plaintiffs argued that the 
necessary parties rule may be dispensed with when joinder 
of all parties is impracticable.86 Lord Eldon held that though 
the plaintiffs could not bring forward all the persons who 
may be liable “that is not an obstacle, that should prevent 
the institution of this suit, if necessary to justice.”87 Lord 
Eldon stated the strict rule that all persons materially 
interested ought to be parties, but acknowledged that there 
were “several well known cases of exception” and cited 
Chancey v. May and Adair v. New River Company, among 
others.88 His view of the necessary parties rule and its 
exceptions can be summarized by a quote from the end of 
his analysis. 
The principle being founded in convenience, a departure from it 
has been said to be justifiable, where necessary; and in all these 
cases the Court has not hesitated to depart from it, with the view 
by original and subsequent arrangement to do all, that can be 
done for the purposes of justice; rather than hold, that no justice 
shall subsist among persons, who may have entered into these 
contracts.89 
The justifications for an exception to the necessary 
parties rule in shareholder-type cases were further 
developed in Meux v. Maltby,90 which involved a lawsuit 
against the directors of the East Country Dock Company, a 
joint-stock company established by an act of Parliament.91 
In 1804, Richard Frost had made a contract with Moses 
Agar to lease a house and contributed to its construction 
costs,92 but later Agar claimed he could not give Frost his 
  
 86. Id., 16 Ves. Jun. at 323-24. 
 87. Id. at 1008, 16 Ves. Jun. at 330. 
 88. Id. at 1007-08, 16 Ves. Jun. at 326-27 (citing Chancey v. May, (1722) 24 
Eng. Rep. 265; Prec. Ch. 592; Adair v. New River Co., (1805) 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 
(Ch.); 11 Ves. Jun. 429). 
 89. Id. at 1008, 16 Ves. Jun. at 329 (emphasis added). 
 90. Meux v. Maltby, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 621 (Ch.); 2 Swans 277. 
 91. Id. at 621-22, 2 Swans. at 277-79 (noting the establishing act decreed that 
all current or future property belonging to the company was vested in the 
company, and that it would be lawful for the company, in the name of its 
treasurer, to sue any person who might damage this property). 
 92. Id. at 621, 2 Swans. at 277. 
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lease because the property had been sold to the East 
Country Dock Company.93 The assignees of Richard Frost 
sued the treasurer and six directors of East Country Dock, 
seeking specific performance of the lease.94 These 
defendants protested that they could not grant the lease 
because they did not have the whole interest and the other 
proprietors of the company were not made parties.95 The 
opinion began with the general rule that the plaintiff must 
bring before the court all necessary parties, but noted the 
rule had exceptions.96 It quoted from Lord Eldon in Lloyd v. 
Loaring that requiring the impracticable joinder of parties 
would result in a “failure of justice.”97 It also quoted Lord 
Eldon in Adair v. New River Company that if the plaintiff 
brings enough of those who represent the King’s share “as 
can be taken duly and honestly” to litigate the issue “that 
ought, in equity, to bind those who are present, 
representing those who are absent.”98 The judge declared 
that this “current of authority” adopts a “general principal 
of exception,” in which the general rule “yields when justice 
requires” on either the plaintiff or defendant side.99 
Applying the rule to this case, the judge noted the only 
novelty was that the plaintiff’s bill “requires an act to be 
done by the absentees.”100 Acknowledging that a lease 
cannot be executed by a few on behalf of the rest, the judge 
declared that the rights of the absent parties may still be 
  
 93. Id. at 621-22, 2 Swans. at 277-78 (noting the property was sold by Agar to 
a man named Matthews, and Matthews then sold the property to Sir Charles 
Price and William Browning, in trust for the East Country Dock Company). 
 94. Id. at 622, 2 Swans. at 279. 
 95. Id. at 623, 2 Swans. at 281. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id., 2 Swans. at 283 (quoting Lloyd v. Loring, (1802) 31 Eng. Rep. 1302 
(Ch.) 1303; 6 Ves. Jun. 773, 775). 
 98. Id. at 624, 2 Swans. at 284 (quoting Adair v. New River Co., (1805) 32 
Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch.) 1159; 11 Ves. Jun. 429, 445) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id., 2 Swans. at 284-85. 
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bound.101 The judge then wrote rather dramatically on the 
necessity of not letting the company avoid responsibility for 
want of parties: “Are the company aware . . . that, in every 
case, it is impracticable to compel them to perform a 
contract? That, unless all the proprietors are made parties, 
which is impossible, no suit can be maintained against them 
. . . ?”102 The judge asserted that he would “do what [he] can 
to assist the Plaintiffs,” by declaring them entitled to the 
lease and restraining the East Country Dock treasurer from 
disturbing their possession.103  
Similarly, in Hichens v. Congreve,104 the court permitted 
shareholders in a mining company, on behalf of themselves 
and all other shareholders, to file a bill seeking to recover 
money misappropriated by the directors.105 The defendants 
demurred that all 200 shareholders had to be made parties, 
but the exception to the necessary parties rule was so well 
established by this point in time that the court rejected the 
defendants’ objection in a mere five paragraphs.106 The court 
similarly approved a representative suit by shareholders on 
behalf of all shareholders against the corporation’s directors 
in Preston v. Grand Collier Dock Co.,107 in which the 
plaintiff’s bill sought to force the directors to pay calls on 
stock subscribed by them.108 
Not all shareholders were successful in their efforts to 
pursue lawsuits on behalf of themselves and all other 
shareholders. In Long v. Yonge,109 the plaintiffs were forty-
seven members of the Norwich Equitable Insurance 
  
 101. Id., 2 Swans. at 285 (“If the Court cannot proceed to compel the 
Defendants to do the act required, it must go as far as it can.”). 
 102. Id., 2 Swans. at 286. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Hichens v. Congreve (1828) 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch.); 4 Russ. 562. 
 105. Id. at 917, 923, 4 Russ. at 562, 577. 
 106. Id. at 922, 4 Russ. at 575-77. 
 107. Preston v. Grand Collier Dock Co., (1840) 59 Eng. Rep. 900 (Vice Ch.); 11 
Sim. 327. 
 108. Id. at 900, 11 Sim. at 327-28. 
 109. Long v. Yonge, (1830) 57 Eng. Rep. 827 (Ch.); 2 Sim. 369.  
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Company, a joint-stock company.110 On behalf of themselves 
and all other members, they sued the survivors of the 
original directors and trustees of the company, those 
appointed to replace the original directors and trustees, and 
the executor of the late company secretary for 
mismanagement of the company and sought to have the 
company dissolved.111 They noted in their bill that it would 
be impracticable to join all the shareholders, who numbered 
around 4,000.112 The defendants demurred for want of equity 
because all 4,000 shareholders had not been made parties 
and because several of the directors had not been made 
parties (presumably as defendants).113 The court allowed 
demurrer.114 After noting both the general rule that all 
interested parties must be joined and the exception stated 
in both Cockburn v. Thompson and Adair v. New River 
Company, the court stated that the demurrer would have 
been denied if the bill had been filed by several members on 
behalf of the rest against someone whom all the members 
had a grievance.115 However, the court concluded that to 
dissolve the company would deprive all the members of a 
right they currently enjoyed, and this could not be done 
without making them parties.116 
By contrast, consider the 1841 case of Wallworth v. 
Holt,117 in which some of the shareholders of an insolvent 
joint-stock bank sued on behalf of themselves and all other 
shareholders, seeking dissolution and their debts from the 
directors.118 The defendants demurred, arguing that all 
shareholders must be joined.119 Plaintiffs argued that there 
were too many shareholders to make them all individually   
 110. Id. at 827, 2 Sim. at 269-70. 
 111. Id. at 827-29, 2 Sim. at 269-75. 
 112. Id. at 829, 2 Sim. at 374. 
 113. Id., 2 Sim. at 375. 
 114. Id. at 834, 2 Sim. at 387. 
 115. Id. at 833, 2 Sim. at 386. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Wallworth v. Holt, (1841) 41 Eng. Rep. 238 (Ch.); 4 My. & Cr. 619. 
 118. Id. at 243, 4 My. & Cr. at 631-32. 
 119. Id. at 243, 4 My. & Cr. at 632. 
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parties to the suit and that all shareholders had a common 
interest.120 The court denied the demurrer.121 Although the 
court recognized that there were strong authorities holding 
that when a bill seeks dissolution all shareholders must be 
parties, it concluded that here they were too numerous and 
the court should “adapt its practice . . . to the existing state 
of society.”122 Citing Cockburn v. Thompson and Chancey v. 
May, the court stated that it is “scarcely necessary to say 
anything as to the objection for want of parties.”123  
C. Foss v. Harbottle and Subsequent Developments in 
English Law 
The 1843 case of Foss v. Harbottle124 is the seminal case 
cited regarding the shareholder derivative action in English 
law.125 Two shareholders in The Victoria Park Company, 
which was incorporated by an Act of Parliament, sued on 
behalf of themselves and all the other shareholders except 
the defendants, who included five directors and the solicitor 
of the company.126 Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants 
engaged in fraudulent and illegal transactions, using their 
positions to cause the corporation to purchase their own 
lands at a price exceeding the value of such lands and to 
cause the corporation to mortgage the lands to fund those 
purchases.127 They sought, among other things, to have the   
 120. Id. at 241, 4 My. & Cr. at 627-28. 
 121. Id. at 246, 4 My. & Cr. at 633. 
 122. Id. at 244, 4 My. & Cr. at 635. But see Deeks v. Stanhope, (1844) 60 Eng. 
Rep. 278 (Ch.) 282-85; 14 Sim. 57, 66-75 (holding all the shareholders must be 
joined for dissolution to occur, but giving plaintiffs leave to amend their bill to 
seek only return of the controverted funds because the court recognized the 
lawsuit would be impossible to maintain if all shareholders were made parties). 
 123. Wallworth, 41 Eng. Rep. at 244-46, 14 Sim. at 636-39 (citing Cockburn v. 
Thompson, (1809) 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (Ch.); 16 Ves. Jun. 321; Chancey v. May, 
(1722) 24 Eng. Rep. 265; Prec. Ch. 592). 
 124. Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch.); 2 Hare 461. 
 125. Skeel, supra note 15, at 167 (stating Foss v. Harbottle “looms large in the 
history of Anglo-American derivative litigation” and “courts on both sides of the 
Atlantic treated the case as a watershed throughout the nineteenth century”). 
 126. Foss, 67 Eng. Rep. at 189-90, 2 Hare at 461. 
 127. Id. at 190-96, 201, 2 Hare at 461-75, 488. 
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defendants “make good to the company” the losses and 
expenses occasioned by the acts complained of.128 
Defendants demurred for “want of equity, want of parties 
and multifariousness; and suggesting that all the 
proprietors of shares in the company . . . were necessary 
parties.”129 Defendants contended that the corporation itself 
was a necessary party and further that only the corporation 
was entitled to bring this action.130  
The court had to consider whether it should depart from 
the rule requiring “that the corporation should sue in its 
own name and in its corporate character, or in the name of 
someone whom the law has appointed to be its 
representative.”131 The court, however, recognized that 
“[c]orporations like this, of a private nature, are in truth 
little more than private partnerships.”132 Relying on 
Wallsworth v. Holt, the court stated that:  
If a case should arise of injury to a corporation by 
some of its members, for which no adequate remedy 
remained, except that of a suit by individual 
corporators in their private characters, and asking 
in such character the protection of those rights to 
which in their corporate character they were 
entitled, … the claims of justice would be found 
superior to any difficulties arising out of technical 
rules respecting the mode in which corporations are 
required to sue.133  
Although Foss involved a true corporation, it recognized a 
right for shareholders to bring a lawsuit on behalf of all the 
shareholders in certain situations, just as the court in 
Wallworth v. Holt did with respect to a joint-stock 
company.134 
  
 128. Id. at 199, 2 Hare at 482-83. 
 129. Id. at 200, 2 Hare at 484. 
 130. Id., 2 Hare at 485. 
 131. Id. at 202, 2 Hare at 490-91. 
 132. Id. at 202-03, 2 Hare at 491-92. 
 133. Id. at 203, 2 Hare at 492. 
 134. Wallworth v. Holt, (1841) 41 Eng. Rep. 238 (Ch.) 244-46; 4 My. & Cr. 619, 
634-40. 
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On the facts of Foss, however, the court concluded that 
the individual shareholders could not bring a lawsuit 
because, pursuant to The Victoria Park Company’s charter, 
the shareholders retained the power to call a special general 
meeting and a majority of the shareholders could confirm 
the transactions.135 In other words, a majority of 
shareholders assembled at a special general meeting could 
confirm the transaction and defeat any decree sought from 
the court in this lawsuit. However, the court stated that if a 
transaction is void, such as when a transaction is beyond 
the powers of the corporation or when managers engaged in 
fraudulent misrepresentation, the corporation cannot 
confirm it “whilst any one dissenting voice is raised against 
it.”136  
Later courts interpreted Foss’s holding to mean that 
nothing connected with internal corporate disputes could be 
made the subject of a bill by one shareholder on behalf of 
himself and all other shareholders, unless the acts were not 
ratifiable by a simple majority of shareholders, such as 
ultra vires or oppressive acts.137 In other words, shareholder 
suits were allowed only if an illegal or fraudulent act was 
alleged, or the wrong was committed by the majority 
shareholders against the minority shareholders.138 Although 
the corporation was the proper party to bring a lawsuit for 
injuries to the corporation, English law recognized that, 
  
 135. See Foss, 67 Eng. Rep. at 203, 2 Hare at 492-94 (stating “that the 
directors are made the governing body, subject to the superior control of the 
proprietors assembled in general meetings . . . [which has power] to originate 
proceedings for any purpose within the scope of the company’s powers, as well 
as to control the directors in any acts which they may have originated”). 
 136. Id. at 203, 207-08, 2 Hare at 493, 504 (citing Preston v. Grand Collier 
Dock Co., (1840) 59 Eng. Rep. 900 (Vice Ch.) 907; 11 Sim. 327, 346-47). 
 137. See, e.g., Russell v. Wakefield Waterworks Co., [1875] 20 L.R. Eq. 474 
(construing Foss to permit shareholders to sue only when the alleged acts were 
ultra vires, or the acts were committed by the majority shareholders against the 
minority shareholders.); Atwool v. Merryweather, [1867] 5 L.R. Eq. 464 
(construing Foss to permit shareholders to sue the majority shareholders for 
managerial fraud); see also Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside 
Director Liability Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385, 1404 (2006) (stating 
the exceptions included fraud on minority shareholders and ultra vires conduct). 
 138. Skeel, supra note 15, at 168. 
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because the board of directors decided when a company 
would sue, the directors were not likely to bring a lawsuit 
against themselves.139 English law thus created an exception 
to the necessary parties rule that permitted a shareholder 
to bring a suit on behalf of the company for ultra vires or 
oppressive acts, but otherwise the English courts would not 
supervise companies.140 
In the middle of the 19th century, the English 
Parliament passed a series of legislation addressing both 
substantive and procedural problems of corporations, joint-
stock companies, and friendly societies, which altered the 
laws originally created through common law development 
by the courts of England.141 Thereafter, the cases concerning 
such entities did not involve questions of group litigation, 
and group litigation “fell into desuetude.”142 Though the 
derivative action was a procedure still available in English 
courts, such lawsuits were extremely uncommon and did 
not play a “significant role” in British law after 1850.143 The   
 139. Cheffins & Black, supra note 137, at 1404. Occasionally new directors 
would bring proceedings when the former directors departed. Id. 
 140. Lord v. Copper Miners’ Co., (1848) 47 Eng. Rep. 1337 (Ch.) 1342; 1 H. & 
Tw. 85, 99 (“If a Court of Equity were to assume jurisdiction in such a case, 
could it do so without opening its doors to all parties interested in corporations, 
or joint stock companies, or private partnerships, who, although a small 
minority of the body to which they belong, may wish to interfere with the 
conduct of the majority? This cannot be done; and the attempt to introduce such 
a remedy ought to be checked, for the benefit of the community.”); see also 
Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Bowley, [2003] EWHC (Comm) 2263, (2004) 1 
B.C.L.C. 180, 188-89. 
 141. YEAZELL, supra note 24, at 194; see also Katharina Pistor et al., The 
Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 791, 798 (2002) (citing Companies Act, 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 89 
(Eng.)).  
 142. YEAZELL, supra note 24, at 194-95; see also id. at 197 (noting that group 
litigation had vanished by the middle of the twentieth century). 
 143. Id. at 211-12; see also Skeel, supra note 15, at 168 (“Derivative litigation 
has always been extremely uncommon in England, and it remains so today.”); 
Bernard Black et al., Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 
Two: Court Procedures, Indemnification and Insurance, and Administrative and 
Criminal Liability (Report to the Russian Securities Agency), 2008 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 1, 26 (2008) (“The circumstances in which this [derivative suit] can be 
done . . . are so obscure and difficult to establish that the derivative action is 
virtually non-existent in England.”). 
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shareholder derivative action essentially disappeared until 
the adoption of the Companies Act of 2006,144 which 
statutorily permitted shareholder derivative lawsuits for 
the first time.145  
II. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE 
LITIGATION IN COURTS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 
After achieving independence from England, courts in 
the United States continued to follow the English necessary 
parties rule and its exceptions. The earliest examples 
involved class action type lawsuits, but the same principles 
were soon applied to lawsuits brought by shareholders in 
corporations created under state law. 
A. The Necessary Parties Rule and Class Actions in the 
United States 
In the 1820 case of West v. Randall,146 Justice Joseph 
Story famously summarized the necessary parties rule and 
its exceptions as recognized by courts in England and in the 
United States, providing extensive citations to opinions of 
both countries.147 The plaintiff was an heir of William West, 
suing the survivors of four trustees for an account of 
property which was allegedly conveyed to them by William 
West in trust for payment of his debts.148 The plaintiff 
  
 144. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/46/pdfs/ukpga_20060046_en.pdf.  
 145. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, Part 11, § 260(1)-(3) (U.K.) (defining a 
derivative claim as a proceeding by a shareholder “in respect of a cause of action 
vested in the company, and []seeking relief on behalf of the company”; stating a 
derivative claim “may be brought only in respect of a cause of action arising 
from an actual or proposed act or omission involving negligence, default, breach 
of duty or breach of trust by a director of the company”). For more information 
on the new Companies Act of 2006 and comparisons to current U.S. shareholder 
derivative law, see Ann M. Scarlett, Imitation or Improvement? The Evolution of 
Shareholder Derivative Litigation in the United States, United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Australia, 28 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 569, 590-604 (2011).  
 146. West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 17,424). 
 147. Id. at 721-24. 
 148. Id. at 721. 
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claimed an eleventh of the resulting surplus, but he did not 
join the other heirs of William West or the personal 
representative as parties.149 The defendant’s answer insisted 
the other heirs were necessary parties.150 Justice Story 
stated that “it is a general rule in equity that all those 
materially interested . . . in the subject of a bill . . . ought to 
be made parties,” and then he proceeded to examine the 
exceptions to the rule.151 After a lengthy consideration of 
“the doctrine as to making parties,” Justice Story held the 
defendants’ objection was well-founded.152  
Five years later, in Elmendorf v. Taylor,153 the U.S. 
Supreme Court elaborated on the nature of the necessary 
parties rule in response to the defendant’s objection that a 
tenant may not sue without joining his co-tenants in a 
lawsuit concerning the law of land surveys.154 The Court 
held that it was not a jurisdiction question, but rather a 
question of Court policy.  
Courts of equity require, that all the parties concerned in interest 
shall be brought before them, that the matter in controversy may 
be finally settled. This equitable rule, however, is framed by the 
Court itself, and is subject to its discretion. It is not, like the 
description of parties, an inflexible rule, a failure to observe which 
turns the party out of Court, because it has no jurisdiction over 
his cause; but, being introduced by the Court itself, for the 
purposes of justice, is susceptible of modification for the promotion 
of those purposes.155  
The court required “the plaintiff to do all in his power to 
bring every person concerned in interest before the Court,” 
but in its discretion permitted the case to proceed even if 
such persons could not be joined because the process of the 
court could not reach them.156  
  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 721. 
 152. Id. at 723-24. 
 153. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152 (1825). 
 154. Id. at 166-67. 
 155. Id.  
 156. See id. at 167. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court, in another opinion written by 
Justice Story, addressed the necessary parties rule in the 
context of an unincorporated association in Mandeville v. 
Riggs157 in 1829. The defendants were stockholders in the 
Merchant’s Bank of Alexandria, which failed a year after its 
inception.158 The plaintiff had not joined all of the 
stockholders, and some deceased stockholders were not 
replaced by representatives in the lawsuit.159 The Supreme 
Court reversed the verdict for the plaintiff on grounds of 
defect of parties and remanded the case so that all 
shareholders, and representatives of deceased shareholders, 
could be brought before the court.160 The Court stated that it 
was not necessary in all cases to bring all stockholders 
before the court: “It is well known, that there are cases in 
which a court of equity dispenses with such a proceeding 
when the parties are very numerous, or unknown, and the 
adoption of the rule would essentially impede, if not defeat 
the purposes of justice.”161 Here, however, the Court held 
that the exception did not apply because, if the decree 
against the defendants was valid, they would be entitled to 
contribution from the other shareholders, who would be 
entitled to “controvert every material fact upon which the 
decree was founded” in a later contribution suit.162 Thus, the 
other shareholders should have been joined to prevent 
“multiplicity of suits.”163  
The 1829 case of Beatty v. Kurtz164 was another U.S. 
Supreme Court opinion written by Justice Story.165 The 
  
 157. Mandeville v. Riggs, 27 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 482, 482 (1829). Mandeville v. 
Riggs and West v. Randall show the class action device was well-recognized by 
federal courts before adoption of Federal Equity Rule 48. Joseph J. Simeone, 
Procedural Problems of Class Suits, 60 MICH. L. REV. 905, 910 & n.27 (1962). 
 158. Mandeville, 27 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 484-85. 
 159. Id. at 482-83, 486. 
 160. Id. at 486-87, 490-91. 
 161. Id. at 487. 
 162. Id. at 487-88. 
 163. Id.  
 164. Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 566 (1829). 
 165. Id. at 578. 
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original plaintiffs were trustees of the German Lutheran 
church of Georgetown and sued “in behalf of themselves and 
the members of the said church.”166 They sued two 
defendants to quiet title to their church and cemetery. 
Among other objections, the defendants denied the 
authority of plaintiffs to sue, “declaring them to be mere 
volunteers, and demanding proof of their authority.”167 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs could 
maintain the bill.168 The court stated that it was not 
necessary to consider whether the plaintiffs had authority, 
because this was “one of those cases, in which certain 
persons, belonging to a voluntary society; and having a 
common interest, may sue in behalf of themselves and 
others having the like interest.”169 The Court thus applied 
an exception to the necessary parties rule in an action that 
today would be classified as a class action. 
In 1838, Justice Story published his Commentaries on 
Equity Pleadings170 in which he expanded his analysis of the 
necessary parties rule and its exceptions.171 In a later 
edition of Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, Justice Story 
described the “proper and necessary parties rule” as “a 
general rule in Equity (subject to certain exceptions, which 
will hereafter be noticed), that all persons materially 
interested, either legally, or beneficially, in the subject-
matter of a suit, are to be made parties to it, either as 
plaintiffs, or as defendants, however numerous they may be, 
so that there may be a complete decree, which shall bind 
them all.”172 By a complete decree between the parties, 
Justice Story noted the court may prevent a multiplicity of 
  
 166. Id. at 579. 
 167. Id. at 580. 
 168. Id. at 582, 585. 
 169. Id. at 585. 
 170. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS AND THE INCIDENTS 
THERETO §§ 72-238, at 61-168 (London, A. Maxwell, Bell Yard 1838).  
 171. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS AND THE INCIDENTS 
THEREOF §§ 72-238, at 85-282 (Boston, Charles C. Little and James Brown, 4th 
ed. 1848). 
 172. Id. § 72, at 86; see also West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718, 721 (C.C.D.R.I. 
1820) (citing GILBERT’S FORUM ROMANUM 157). 
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lawsuits and ensure that no injustice is done by taking a 
partial view of the merits of the case.173 This was contrary to 
the rule observed in courts of law that only “the persons 
directly and immediately interested in the subject-matter of 
the suit, and whose interests are of a strictly legal nature, 
should be parties to it.”174 Story stated that the purpose of 
the necessary parties rule was to achieve justice and was 
based on public convenience, but that the “Courts of Equity 
will not suffer [the rule] to be so applied as to defeat the 
very purposes of justice, if they can dispose of the merits of 
the case before them without prejudice to the rights or 
interests of other persons, who are not parties, or if the 
circumstances of the case render the application of the rule 
wholly impracticable.”175  
Justice Story then explained the exceptions to the 
necessary parties rule including the representative 
exception, among others.176 In discussing these exceptions, 
Story noted that both the general rule and the exceptions 
were motivated by equitable principles: rules being 
established for the convenient administration of justice 
should not be followed when they are incapable of being 
applied.177 In these situations, granting relief to the plaintiff 
without making the other persons parties was a lesser evil 
than to “wholly deny the plaintiff the equitable relief, to 
  
 173. STORY, supra note 171, § 72, at 87; see also West, 29 F. Cas. at 721 (citing, 
among others, Cockburn v. Thompson, (1809) 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (Ch.); 16 Ves. 
Jun. 321). 
 174. STORY, supra note 171, § 76, at 91. 
 175. Id. § 77, at 101 (stating “the object of the general rule is to accomplish the 
purposes of justice between all the parties in interest, and it is a rule founded, 
in some sort, upon public convenience and policy”); see also West, 29 F. Cas. at 
722-23 (citing Adair v. New River Co., (1805) 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch.); 11 Ves. 
Jun. 429, and Cockburn, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005; 16 Ves. Jun. 321, for the proposition 
that the necessary parties rule is adopted merely for convenience and may be 
dispensed with when compliance is impracticable).  
 176. Other exceptions include cases where one party is out of the jurisdiction, 
or where joinder of certain parties destroys diversity jurisdiction. STORY, supra 
note 171, §§ 78-79, at 102-04; see also Milligan v. Milledge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 
220, 228 (1805) (holding that a want of proper parties was not a good plea when 
the parties are out of the jurisdiction of the court). 
 177. STORY, supra note 171, § 96, at 121. 
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which he is entitled.”178 To achieve justice in these cases, the 
court “will generally require the Bill to be filed, not only in 
behalf of the plaintiff, but also in behalf of all other persons 
interested, who are not directly made parties (although in a 
sense they are thus made so), so that they may come in 
under the decree, and take the benefit of it, or show it to be 
erroneous, or entitle themselves to a rehearing.”179 Story 
also mentioned that in these situations, courts will 
entertain bills bringing “the rights and interests of the 
absent parties” before the court if there is any danger “of 
injury or injustice to them.”180  
Story listed three sets of cases falling within the 
representation exception. First, “where the question is one 
of a common or general interest, and one or more sue, or 
defend for the benefit of the whole,” such as a lawsuit 
brought by a few ship crew members on behalf of the whole 
crew.181 This class of cases would also include suits brought 
on behalf of many persons including some who cannot be 
easily found.182 For instance, creditors may bring a suit on 
behalf of themselves and all the other creditors seeking an 
account of the estate of a deceased debtor to obtain payment 
from his representative, and then the other creditors may 
“come in under the decree” and prove their debts to the 
judge.183 
The second set of cases within the representation 
exception included “where the parties form a voluntary 
association for public or private purposes, and those, who 
sue, or defend, may fairly be presumed to represent the 
rights and interests of the whole.”184 Thus, a few members of 
  
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. § 96, at 122 (emphasis added). 
 180. Id. § 96, at 122-23. 
 181. Id. §§ 97-98, at 123-25. 
 182. Id. § 99, at 125; see also id. §§ 99-103, at 125-34.  
 183. Id. § 99, at 125-27. Another example is suits by legatees seeking relief 
against executors may sue on behalf of themselves and other legatees. Id. §§ 
104-106, at 134-39. 
 184. Id. § 97, at 123; see also West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718, 722 (C.C.D.R.I. 
1820). 
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a voluntary society or unincorporated body of proprietors 
were allowed to sue on behalf of the rest, seeking relief 
against their own agents.185 Because such associations 
commonly involved numerous persons with privity of 
interest and joinder of all them would be exceedingly 
inconvenient, courts allowed representation by some of the 
parties on behalf of themselves and all the others, “taking 
care, that there shall be a due representation of all 
substantial interests before the Court.”186 “[S]uch a Bill 
must be brought on behalf of all the parties in interest; for if 
it be brought for the plaintiffs alone, it will not be sustained 
by the Court for the want of proper parties.”187 This 
exception applied when the members of an association or 
proprietors were sued as defendants or plaintiffs.188 
For the third set of cases within the representation 
exception, Justice Story included those “where the parties 
are very numerous, and although they have, or may have, 
separate distinct interests; yet it is impracticable to bring 
them all before the Court.”189 This exception applied where 
the parties were “exceedingly numerous, and it would be 
impracticable to join them without almost interminable 
delays, and other inconveniences, which would obstruct, and 
probably defeat the purposes of justice.”190 In such cases 
where the parties were too numerous to make it practicable 
to prosecute the suit if they were all made parties, the court 
dispensed with them if a decree could be rendered without 
injury to the absent persons (generally when their interests 
were only “incidentally and indirectly affected” by the 
  
 185. STORY, supra note 171, § 108, at 141-42. 
 186. Id. § 107, at 141; see also id. § 108, at 141-42 (discussing Chancey v. May, 
(1722) 24 Eng. Rep. 265; Prec. Ch. 592.); id. § 109, at 142 (discussing Hichens v. 
Congreve, (1828) 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch.) 922; 4 Russ. 562, 576); id. § 115, at 146 
(discussing Small v. Atwood, (1832) 159 Eng. Rep. 1051 (Ch.) 1052; You. 407, 
408). 
 187. STORY, supra note 171, § 107, at 141. 
 188. Id. §§ 116-119, at 149-52. 
 189. Id. § 97, at 123-24; see also id. § 120, at 152. 
 190. Id. § 94, at 119 (citing, among others, Adair v. New River Co., (1805) 32 
Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch.); 11 Ves. Jun. 429 and Cockburn v. Thompson, (1809) 33 
Eng. Rep. 1005 (Ch.); 16 Ves. Jun. 321); see also id. § 95, at 120-21. 
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decree).191 “In this class of cases, there is usually a privity of 
interest between the parties,” or at least “a common 
interest, or a common right, which the Bill seeks to 
establish and enforce.”192 In most of these cases, the 
resulting decree “will ordinarily be held binding upon all 
other persons standing in the same predicament,” and thus 
the court must ensure that adequate representatives exist 
to “honestly, fairly, and fully” try the right.193 In these 
circumstances, when a few were permitted to represent 
themselves and all others and “the decree must directly 
affect the interests” of the absent persons, they had a right 
“to be heard before the decree is made.”194  
It has often been said that Justice Story “in a clear but 
indirect way, virtually created the American law of class 
suits.”195 His analysis of the necessary parties rule and the 
exceptions to the rule in Commentaries on Equity Pleading 
were essentially codified when the Supreme Court 
promulgated the Federal Equity Rules 47 and 48 in 1842.196  
[Rule 47:] In all cases where it shall appear to the court, that 
persons, who might otherwise be deemed necessary or proper 
parties to the suit, cannot be made parties by reason of their being 
out of the jurisdiction of the court, or incapable otherwise of being 
made parties, or because their joinder would oust the jurisdiction 
of the court as to the parties before the court, the court may in 
their discretion proceed in the case without making such persons 
parties; and in such cases the decree shall be without prejudice to 
the rights of the absent parties.  
[Rule 48:] Where the parties on either side are very numerous, 
and cannot, without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays 
in the suit, be all brought before it, the court in its discretion may 
  
 191. STORY, supra note 171, § 94, at 119-20. 
 192. Id. § 120, at 152; see also id. § 126, at 158-59. 
 193. Id. § 120, at 152-53. 
 194. Id. § 130, at 162. 
 195. Hazard et al., supra note 38, at 1878; see also YEAZELL, supra note 24, at 
216 (describing Joseph Story’s role in the promotion of group litigation in 
America). 
 196. See Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational 
Device?, 1983 SUPREME CT. REV. 459, 460-61 (1983); YEAZELL, supra note 24, at 
221. 
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dispense with making all of them parties, and may proceed in the 
suit, having sufficient parties before it to represent all the adverse 
interests of the plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly 
before it. But in such cases the decree shall be without prejudice 
to the rights and claims of all the absent parties.197 
The Supreme Court, however, continued to rely on the 
common law interpretations of the necessary parties rule 
and its exceptions in interpreting Federal Equity Rules 47 
and 48.  
Relying on the common law of the necessary parties 
rule, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Swormstedt198 in 1853 
ignored the last line of Rule 48, regarding the res judicata 
effect of a class decree. In Swormstedt, the bill to recover a 
share of a fund was filed by a number of preachers, on 
behalf of themselves and the rest of the traveling 1,500 
preachers of the Methodist Episcopal Church South.199 The 
case also involved a group of defendants as the bill was filed 
against several preachers of the newly-split Methodist 
Episcopal Church North on behalf of its 3,800 preachers.200 
The defendants objected for want of parties, and the 
plaintiffs argued that each of these numerous preachers had 
“an interest in the fund in the same right, so that it is 
impossible . . . to make them all parties to the bill.”201 The 
Court held the objection was improper.202 Citing Story’s 
Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, the Court declared it a 
well-established rule that “where the parties interested are 
numerous, and the suit is for an object common to them all, 
some of the body may maintain a bill on behalf of 
themselves and of the others; and a bill may also be 
maintained against a portion of a numerous body of 
defendants, representing a common interest.”203 Again citing   
 197. 42 U.S. (1 How.), at lv-lvi (1843). 
 198. Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 302-03 (1853); see also 
Hazard et al., supra note 38, at 1901. 
 199. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 298, 300. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 300, 302. 
 202. Id. at 302. 
 203. Id. (citing STORY, supra note 171). But see Hazard et al., supra note 38, at 
1899 (noting that, while the opinion draws heavily on Story’s Commentaries on 
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Story, the Court noted that the rights of the several parties 
may be distinct, but there must be “a common interest or a 
common right” for the court to enforce.204 It cautioned that 
“care must be taken that persons are brought on the record 
fairly representing the interest or right involved, so that it 
may be fully and honestly tried.”205 Directly contradicting 
the last sentence of Federal Equity Rule 48, the Court also 
stated that “the decree binds all of them the same as if all 
were before the court.”206 The Court declared that the 
representation exception to the necessary parties rule 
applied, because to require that all the parties must be 
joined would essentially amount to “a denial of justice.”207  
The general trend in state and federal cases in the late 
1800s was to allow representation when there was a 
common interest between the party and the absent person, 
but holding that “common question” representation was not 
sufficient.208 For example, in Mason v. York & Cumberland 
Railroad Company,209 the Maine Supreme Court allowed 
one bondholder on behalf of all bondholders to pursue a bill 
to recover the mortgage securing the bonds because, while 
bondholders are numerous and constantly changing, their 
interest is homogenous.210 The court also noted that if no 
representation were allowed the plaintiff would be without 
remedy, but recognized that it must “carefully guard” the 
  
Equity Pleadings, it “took no note of the qualifications and uncertainties that 
Story expressed in his treatise” regarding the binding effects of such 
judgments). 
 204. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 302 (citing STORY, supra note 171); see 
also Hazard et al., supra note 38, at 1899 (noting this phrase, from Story’s 
Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, became a formula for courts to identify a 
representative suit with binding effect). 
 205. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 303 (emphasis added). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See, e.g., In re Engelhard & Sons Co., 231 U.S. 646, 649-52 (1914); 
Hutchinson, supra note 196, at 467-69. 
 209. Mason v. York & Cumberland R.R. Co., 52 Me. 82 (1861). 
 210. Id. at 108-09 (citing STORY, supra note 171 and Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 
How.) 288). 
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interests of the absent parties.211 By contrast, the court in 
Cutting v. Gilbert212 did not allow representation because 
the only matter in common was an interest in the question 
involved.213 Six brokerage firms, on behalf of themselves and 
all others doing business as brokers, had filed a lawsuit 
against a tax assessor seeking to enjoin the collection of a 
certain tax.214 The defendants objected that there was not a 
joint interest that would allow the plaintiffs to represent the 
rest.215 The court agreed, stating that the interest required 
was an interest in the subject matter of the suit, not merely 
an interest in the answering of a legal question.216  
In 1912, the Supreme Court promulgated revisions to 
the Federal Equity Rules. The revisions made the decree in 
a class suit binding on absent parties, as had been held in 
Swormstedt, and also permitted common question 
representation.217 Then in 1938, the Supreme Court 
  
 211. Id. at 107-09. 
 212. Cutting v. Gilbert, 6 F. Cas. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1865). 
 213. Id. at 1080. 
 214. Id. at 1079-80. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 1080; see also Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 116-17 (1897) (plaintiff 
sought an injunction in a bill filed on behalf of himself and all others in South 
Carolina who import alcohol from other states for their own use; court held that 
merely a common interest in the question is not enough to support 
representation). 
 217. The text of the revised Federal Equity Rules 38 and 39 reads as follows: 
Rule 38. Representatives of Class: When the question is one of common 
or general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as 
to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more 
may sue or defend for the whole. 
Rule 39. Absence of Persons who would be Proper Parties: In all cases 
where it shall appear to the court that persons, who might otherwise be 
deemed proper parties to the suit, can not be made parties by reason of 
their being out of the jurisdiction of the court, or incapable otherwise of 
being made parties, or because their joinder would oust the jurisdiction 
of the court as to the parties before the court, the court may, in its 
discretion, proceed in the cause without making such persons parties; 
and in such cases the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights of 
the absent parties. 
226 U.S. 659. 
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promulgated the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
merged law and equity for the first time.218 Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23 specifically codified class actions and 
Rule 23, as revised in 1966, is substantially the same as 
today’s rule.219 Justice Story’s classification of class actions 
arguably endures to modern times through Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23.220 
B. Recognition of Shareholder Actions in the United States 
Commentators have often said that U.S. courts 
imported the shareholder derivative device from England,221 
but that is not entirely accurate. Unlike in England, 
American courts have “never limited shareholder litigation 
to cases involving ultra vires acts” or oppressive acts by a 
controlling majority.222 However, unlike English courts,223 
American courts restricted shareholders to filing lawsuits 
only in situations in which the corporation was incapable of 
seeking redress or improperly refused to seek redress. Even 
with that restriction, shareholders have been able to pursue 
derivative actions far more easily in the United States than 
in England.224  
1. Shareholder Litigation in the State Courts. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court appears to have decided the first 
shareholder action in the United States in 1829. In Percy v. 
Millaudon,225 the plaintiffs were stockholders in Planters’   
 218. FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
 219. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 Advisory Notes. 
 220. Hazard et al., supra note 38, at 1878 (noting that Story’s Commentaries 
on Equity Pleadings influenced the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopted in 
1938 and is still embedded in Rule 23). 
 221. See, e.g., Howson, supra note 21, at 47. 
 222. Skeel, supra note 15, at 168. 
 223. England has never required shareholders to make a demand on the 
directors. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 261(1) (U.K.) (requiring a shareholder 
filing a derivative claim only to “apply to the court for permission . . . to continue 
it”); Kurt A. Goehre, Is the Demand Requirement Obsolete? How the United 
Kingdom Modernized Its Shareholder Derivative Procedure and What the United 
States Can Learn from It, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 140, 142-43 (2010). 
 224. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 15, at 168-69. 
 225. Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829). 
872 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
Bank, which was incorporated by act of the Louisiana 
Territory Legislature,226 and they sued three of the directors 
for fraudulent and unfaithful conduct.227 This case 
demonstrates that U.S. courts, similar to the English 
courts, were applying the necessary parties rule and its 
exceptions to class actions as well as shareholder lawsuits. 
Several stockholders had refused to join the plaintiffs’ 
petition, so the trial court stated that they “were necessarily 
made parties to the suit in order that a final settlement 
should be made between all, having an interest in the 
institution.”228 The Louisiana Supreme Court summarized 
the case as being brought by the owners of 413 shares and 
that the other stockholders who had declined to become 
plaintiffs were joined as defendants “for no other purpose, 
than that of having all the stockholders in court.”229 This 
case is typically cited by scholars as the earliest example of 
a court stating that directors’ decisions are entitled to 
deference.230 However, the Louisiana Supreme Court found 
that the directors were “much influenced by a view to 
promote the interest of a few individuals” in voting to allow 
the president to discount notes in contravention of the 
corporate charter and ultimately held the defendants liable 
for their acts.231  
Similarly, in Taylor v. Miami Exporting Company,232 the 
Ohio Supreme Court allowed a stockholder of a bank to 
pursue a bill in equity against the corporation and its 
directors, with other stockholders not joining the suit 
aligned as defendants.233 The plaintiff alleged 
mismanagement and fraud by the president and directors of 
the Miami Exporting Company, which had been 
  
 226. Percy v. Millaudon, 3 La. 568, 568-69 (1832). 
 227. Percy, 8 Mart. (n.s.) at 68. 
 228. Id. at 71. 
 229. Percy, 3 La. at 568, 570. 
 230. See, e.g., S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 97-98 (1979). 
 231. Percy, 3 La. at 580. 
 232. Taylor v. Miami Exp. Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831). 
 233. Id. at 168-69. 
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incorporated in 1803.234 After noting that the bill did not put 
into issue the life of the corporation nor interrupt the 
exercise of its corporate functions, the court stated that the 
corporation was not exempt from legal responsibility.235 “We 
cannot believe the powers of this court to be so feeble as not 
to reach a case of such palpable fraud . . . .”236 Therefore, the 
court held that the stockholder could sustain a bill in equity 
against the corporation and its directors, with the other 
stockholders named as defendants.237  
The first U.S. lawsuit in which shareholders were 
permitted to bring a representative action on behalf of 
themselves and the other shareholders against the 
corporation’s directors was the 1832 case of Robinson v. 
Smith.238 Stockholders in the New York Coal Company, a 
company incorporated in 1824, filed an equitable action 
against the directors for fraud and mismanagement.239 
Although the company had received its corporate charter for 
the purpose of exploring for, digging, and vending coal and 
was restricted from carrying on any banking business, the 
stockholders claimed that the directors had used their funds 
almost exclusively to buy and sell stocks in other 
corporations.240 Noting that the plaintiffs owned only 160 of 
the company’s 4,000 shares of stock, the defendants 
demurred, arguing that all the shareholders needed to be 
joined.241 The court held that the objection could not be 
sustained.242 All the complainants were cestui que trusts, 
having the same interest in every respect: “They are seeking 
precisely the same redress against their trustees, and for 
the same acts; by which they allege they have received a 
  
 234. Id. at 162-63. 
 235. Id. at 166-68. 
 236. Id. at 167. 
 237. Id. at 168-69. 
 238. Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832). 
 239. Id. at 222-23. 
 240. Id. at 222, 228 (Chancellor described this conduct as stock jobbing at its 
wildest). 
 241. Id. at 224. 
 242. Id. at 230-31. 
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similar and common injury.”243 Thus, the court held that 
there was no reason to file separate bills.244 The court 
recognized that generally a suit to compel corporate officers 
to account for their actions should be in the name of the 
corporation, but stated that it should not permit a wrong to 
go unredressed merely for the sake of form.245 The court 
stated that if the “corporation refused to prosecute” or “was 
still under the control of” the defendants, the stockholders 
“would be permitted to file a bill in their own names” and on 
behalf of all the shareholders, with the corporation being 
made a defendant.246 “[I]f the stockholders are so numerous 
as to render it impossible, or very inconvenient to bring 
them all before the court, a part[y] might file a bill in behalf 
of themselves and all others standing in the same 
situation.”247 The court then declared it the law of the state 
that directors of corporations “who willfully abuse their 
trust, or misapply the funds of the company, by which a loss 
is sustained, are personally liable as trustees to make good 
that loss.”248  
The New York Chancery Court again summarized when 
stockholders could pursue an action in their own names in 
Forbes v. Whitlock249 in 1840.  
Cases have occurred in which stockholders have been at liberty to 
exhibit a bill in their own names. This can be done when the 
directors, officers or managers, having the control of the 
corporation and its affairs, are guilty of misconduct that amounts 
to a breach of their duty as trustees.250  
However, the court held that if the complaint was not 
against the board of directors but simply a single member, 
  
 243. Id. at 230-31. 
 244. Id. (citing Brinkerhoff v. Brown, 7 Johns. Ch. 217 (N.Y. Ch. 1822)). 
 245. Id. at 233.  
 246. Id.  
 247. Id.  
 248. Id. at 231.  
 249. Forbes v. Whitlock, 3 Edw. Ch. 446, 448 (N.Y. Ch. 1840). 
 250. Id. at 448. 
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then “the corporation itself has the exclusive right to sue.”251 
Thus, the stockholders’ lawsuit alleging fraudulent acts 
against a single director could not be brought by the 
stockholders independently.252  
Shareholders’ right to file suit when the corporation is 
incapable of doing so or improperly refuses to do so was also 
recognized in Maine in 1844. In Hersey v. Veazie,253 a 
shareholder sued an agent of the corporation for fraud in 
causing the franchise of the corporation to be sold.254 The 
court held that the wrongs alleged were wrongs committed 
against the corporation and, until it has been shown that 
the corporation is incapable of doing so, no shareholder can 
assume the right of the corporation to obtain redress for 
such wrongs.255 The court noted that, if after attempting to 
get the corporation to make redress, it was found incapable 
of doing it or improperly refused to do so, the shareholders 
may bring suit by making the corporation a party 
defendant.256 In this case, however, there was no allegation 
that the corporation had refused to call upon the defendant 
to account for the harm done.257 
In 1855, the Maine Supreme Court again addressed the 
issue. In Smith v. Poor,258 the court stated that a 
shareholder could not bring bill in equity “against the 
officers for misfeasance, until proper measures have been 
taken to induce the corporation to obtain redress, and they 
improperly refuse.”259 However, if the corporation was under   
 251. Id. at 447-48. 
 252. Id. at 448.  
 253. Hersey v. Veazie, 24 Me. 9 (1844). 
 254. Id. at 11. 
 255. Id. at 12. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 13.  
 258. Smith v. Poor, 40 Me. 415 (1855) (holding shareholder’s claim that 
directors fraudulently prevented the execution of his contract could be asserted 
only against the company, not the directors). 
 259. Id. at 418 (citing Hersey, 24 Me.); id. at 421 (stating that if an injury 
resulted to the plaintiff in common with other stockholders, the remedy would 
be by the corporation because directors are responsible to the corporation for 
misconduct in the discharge of their duties). 
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the control of guilty parties, the court stated that the 
remedy would be by “some of the injured stockholders for 
the benefit of all.”260 In all cases, the court noted that “the 
corporation is a necessary party either as complainants or 
defendants.”261 
In 1866, the Maine Supreme Court elaborated on when 
shareholders could bring suit in Kennebec & Portland R.R. 
Co. v. Portland & Kennebec R.R. Co.262 The complainants 
alleged that the directors carelessly, negligently, and 
unskillfully managed the company, and that the net 
earnings were $50,000 less annually than had the company 
been managed faithfully.263  
The corporation itself is regarded as a distinct person; and its 
property is legally vested in itself, and not in its stockholders. As 
individuals, they cannot, even by joining together unanimously, 
convey a title to it, or maintain an action at law for its possession, 
or for damages done to it. The . . . corporation must manage its 
affairs in its own name, as exclusively as a natural person 
manages his property and business. The officers, though chosen 
by a vote of the stockholders, are not their agents, but the agents 
of the corporation, and they are accountable to it alone.” 
Stockholders undoubtedly have an interest in the property 
and business of the corporation, which will be protected in equity 
when invaded. They have equitable rights which, when violated, 
may be enforced by equitable remedies. “The corporation itself 
holds its property as trustee for the stockholders, who have a joint 
interest in all its property and effects, and each of whom is related 
to it as cestui que trust.” So long as the corporation is faithful to its 
trust, the stockholders, as individuals, have no occasion and no 
right to resort to or enforce any remedies, legal or equitable, to 
vindicate any injury to the corporate property. When it is guilty of 
a breach of trust, then, and only then, the relationship of the 
stockholders, arising from that trust, gives them a right to pursue 
the proper remedy to vindicate their rights. But, in such a case, it 
necessarily follows that the corporation must, or at least may be, a 
party defendant; for it is only the violation of the trust existing 
  
 260. Id. at 420. 
 261. Id. at 422. 
 262. Kennebec & Portland R.R. Co. v. Portland & Kennebec R.R. Co, 54 Me. 
173 (1866). 
 263. Id. at 176. 
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between the corporation and its stockholders, that gives the latter 
any occasion for a remedy.264 
The court found the bill defective for misjoinder of plaintiffs 
because there was no allegation the corporation had 
breached its trust with stockholders.265  
Massachusetts subsequently followed Maine’s 
formulation of when to permit shareholder litigation. 
Although the Massachusetts Supreme Court did not allow a 
stockholder of a bank to pursue an action against the 
directors for negligence in conducting the bank’s affairs in 
Smith v. Hurd266 in 1847, it stated that shareholders could 
pursue litigation when the corporation failed to do so or was 
incapable of doing so.267 The stockholder had alleged 
nonfeasance and misfeasance led the bank to fail.268 The 
court held that no legal privity existed between the 
shareholder and the directors,269 because the directors’ 
duties arose from a promise to the corporation, not to the 
stockholders.270 The court stated that the directors were 
agents and the corporation was the principal, and therefore 
a stockholder could not call the corporation’s “agents to 
account, by a bill in equity, without the consent of the 
corporation legally obtained.”271 However, the court 
recognized an exception: a stockholder could bring a bill in 
  
 264. Id. at 181 (citation omitted) (quoting Peabody v. Flint, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 
52, 55-56 (1863)). 
 265. Id. at 1882. 
 266. Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371 (1847). 
 267. Id. at 377-78. 
 268. Id. at 375. 
 269. Id. at 384. 
 270. Id. at 373. 
 271. Id. at 377-78 (“As the corporation may have a single action for the whole 
injury alleged to have been done by the defendants, there is no reason why each 
stockholder should have an action; and as no stockholder can have suffered any 
special damage, that is, any damage not also suffered by the others, the 
analogies of the law would seem to confine the remedy to a single action by a 
party that can recover for the whole injury.”). 
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equity when “the corporation is incapable of obtaining 
redress, or collusively refuses to seek it.”272  
The Massachusetts Supreme Court reiterated this 
principle in Peabody v. Flint273 in 1863 and in Brewer v. 
Boston Theatre274 in 1870. In Peabody, two stockholders filed 
a bill in equity on behalf of themselves and the other 
stockholders of the Lowell and Salem Railroad Company 
alleging conspiracy and fraud against certain directors and 
agents of the company.275 Although acknowledging 
stockholders’ interest was merely an equitable interest, the 
court stated that an equitable interest possessed equitable 
rights that may be enforced by equitable remedies.276  
The corporation may call its officers to account if they willfully 
abuse their trust, or misapply the funds of the company; and if it 
refuses to sue, or is still under the control of those who must be 
made defendants in the suit, the stockholders who are the real 
parties in interest may file a bill in their own names, making the 
corporation a party defendant; or a part of them may file a bill in 
behalf of themselves and all others standing in the same 
relation.277  
This bill, however, was ultimately dismissed for 
unreasonable delay.278  
The shareholders in Brewer v. Boston Theatre alleged 
that several directors of the corporation leased its property 
to parties whom they secretly had agreed to share in the 
advantages of such leases.279 To pursue their lawsuit, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had 
to show that redress cannot be obtained through action of 
the corporation and plaintiff must have applied to the board 
  
 272. Id. at 378. 
 273. Peabody v. Flint, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 52 (1863). 
 274. Brewer v. Boston Theatre, 104 Mass. 378 (1870). 
 275. Peabody, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) at 52. 
 276. Id. at 56. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 57-58. 
 279. Brewer, 104 Mass. at 378. 
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to bring an action and the board must have refused.280 “It is 
only from the necessity of the case, and to prevent a failure 
of justice, that suits in equity in the form of these bills are 
allowed.”281 The court recognized that there was “some 
diversity” as to what satisfied the requirement that suitable 
redress was not attainable through the action of the 
corporation.282 It held that where stockholders retain no 
control of the corporate business, except by annual elections 
of officers, a simple refusal by the officers to take proper 
action to protect the corporation’s interests should be 
sufficient to allow a lawsuit on behalf of the stockholders.”283 
In what could be an early statement of the demand excusal 
test, the court stated, “[a] formal application and refusal 
need not be alleged, if enough appears to show that such an 
application would be unavailing.”284 The court found that 
because the majority of the corporation was under the 
control of the defendants being accused and the alleged 
breaches of trusts by the defendants could not be ratified by 
the corporation, there was no capacity for the plaintiffs to 
move the corporation to take action for their redress.285  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1849 permitted 
shareholders to bring an action on behalf of themselves and 
the other shareholders in Putnam v. Sweet.286 The plaintiffs 
(about twenty in number) filed a bill on behalf of themselves 
and subscribers to the stock of Milwaukee and Janesville 
Plank Road Company, chartered on March 6, 1848.287 The 
complainants alleged the directors permitted the fraudulent 
subscription of thousands of shares.288 The court held that it 
was not necessary for all the shareholders to be made 
  
 280. Id. at 386.  
 281. Id.  
 282. Id. at 387. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 396. 
 286. Putnam v. Sweet, 2 Pin. 302 (Wis. 1849). 
 287. Id. at 302-09. 
 288. Id. at 325. 
880 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
parties.289 A few of a large number could maintain a bill in 
equity on behalf of themselves and their fellow 
shareholders, even when a majority was opposed to the 
suit.290 As the court stated, “[a] more appropriate case ‘for 
some of a large number having a common right to maintain 
a suit in behalf of themselves and fellows, in aid of that 
common right,’ cannot well occur.”291 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Hodges v. New 
England Screw Company292 permitted stockholders to sue 
directors for mismanagement.293 The court noted that the 
corporation was the party injured by breaches of trust by its 
managers and thus was the primary party to sue for such 
acts, but held that the stockholders in their individuals 
names could bring suit when the corporation refused to 
sue.294 On the merits, the court held that the directors had 
acted in good faith for the benefit of the company and under 
the belief that their actions were lawful.295 
The Connecticut Supreme Court recognized an 
exception to the necessary parties rule for shareholders in 
Allen v. Curtis296 in 1857. Stockholders of a bank brought an 
action at law against the corporation’s directors alleging 
that the directors willfully managed the corporation’s 
affairs in an “unskillful, careless, and reckless manner.”297 
The court recognized the principle that directors are agents 
of the corporation and only liable to it, and that the 
corporation is the sole representative of the stockholder.298 
However, the court noted that an individual stockholder, on 
  
 289. Id. at 345. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id.  
 292. Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312 (1850). 
 293. Id. at 340-41. 
 294. Id.  
 295. Id. at 344. 
 296. Allen v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 456 (1857). 
 297. Id. at 457. The alleged actions included “making false entries in the books 
of the bank [and] loaning money without security.” Id. 
 298. Id. at 461. 
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behalf of himself and all the stockholders, may bring suit in 
equity if “the corporation is unable to bring suit, or if, 
through fraud and collusion, the directors refuse or neglect 
to bring suit in the corporate name.”299 Because there was no 
allegation that through fraud or collusion the corporation 
refused to sue, the suit was not allowed.300  
In March v. Eastern Railroad Company,301 the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court held that stockholders, on behalf 
of themselves and all the stockholders, had a remedy in 
equity against the directors and the corporation to prevent 
any misapplication of the corporation’s assets.302 Railroad A 
had leased part of the railroad track owned by Railroad B 
but then refused to pay rent.303 When the board of Railroad 
B refused to take measures to collect the rent payments, 
stockholders in Railroad B brought suit against their own 
corporation, its directors, and the corporation of Railroad 
A.304 The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were not 
proper parties to bring suit because all the stockholders 
were not made parties.305 However, the court held that it 
was a “well settled” principle that when the parties are 
numerous, and “the suit is for an object common to them all, 
some of the body may maintain a bill in behalf of 
themselves and others having a like interest.”306 
Furthermore, the court noted that it was no longer doubted 
that courts of equity have “jurisdiction over corporations, at 
the instance of one or more of their members, to apply 
preventative remedies by injunction.”307 Citing Robinson v. 
Smith, the court stated that, “[i]f the directors of a 
corporation refuse to prosecute, . . . the stockholders, who 
  
 299. Id. at 461-62. 
 300. Id. at 462. 
 301. March v. Eastern R.R. Co., 40 N.H. 548 (1860). 
 302. Id. at 548. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 566. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. at 567. 
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are the real parties in interest, would be permitted to file a 
bill in their own names.”308 
2. Shareholder Litigation in the Federal Court. Early 
shareholder lawsuits in the United States were all decided 
by state courts. The U.S. Supreme Court did not address 
shareholder actions until Dodge v. Woolsey309 in 1855. In 
Dodge, a stockholder filed suit against a third party tax 
collector seeking an injunction to prevent the county 
treasurer from collecting an allegedly unconstitutional tax 
on the corporation, Commercial Branch Bank of 
Cleveland.310 The Court allowed the stockholder to step in 
between the corporation and a third party to institute and 
control a suit concerning the rights of the corporation311 
because the directors of the bank had refused to take any 
steps to prevent the collection of the tax upon demand of the 
stockholder.312 The Court viewed the directors’ action to be a 
breach of duty and held the stockholder had a right to bring 
suit in equity to restrain the collection of the tax, but it did 
not directly address the representative nature of the case.313 
The underlying story of this case, and many other early 
shareholder cases in the Supreme Court, was that by the 
out-of-state shareholder bringing the action, the case could 
be filed in federal court on diversity grounds. Diversity 
jurisdiction in the federal court was preferable to having a 
court of the local government deciding the constitutionality 
of the local tax.  
In Bronson v. La Cross & Milwaukie Railroad 
Company,314 the U.S. Supreme Court again permitted a 
stockholder to defend a suit against the company where the 
directors refused to do so.315 A plaintiff had filed a bill 
against the La Crosse and Milwaukie Railroad Company,   
 308. Id. at 567-68 (citing Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832)). 
 309. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855). 
 310. Id. at 335-36. 
 311. Id. at 341.  
 312. Id. at 344-45. 
 313. Id. at 345. 
 314. Bronson v. La Cross & Milwaukie R.R. Co., 69 U.S. 283 (1864). 
 315. Id. at 303. 
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seeking to foreclose a mortgage of the corporation.316 
According to the shareholder who sought to defend the case, 
the directors had refused to defend the bill for the 
“fraudulent purpose of sacrificing the interests of the 
stockholders.”317 The court found that “it would be a 
reproach to the law . . . if stockholders were remediless” and 
thus used its discretion to “permit a stockholder to become a 
party defendant, for the purpose of protecting his own 
interest against unfounded or illegal claims against the 
company.”318  
In Memphis City v. Dean,319 the corporation, Memphis 
Gaslight Company, entered into a charter in 1852 that 
allegedly gave the company exclusive rights to provide gas 
to the city for twenty years.320 However, “[i]n 1866, the State 
passed an act incorporating another gaslight company.”321 
Memphis Gaslight Company therefore filed a bill in a state 
court of chancery against the new corporation, but a 
permanent injunction was not granted.322 Following 
initiation of the corporation’s lawsuit, a stockholder filed a 
bill “against the new company[] and also against the city of 
Memphis.”323 Citing Dodge v. Woolsey, the Supreme Court 
stated that for the stockholder to have standing, the 
stockholder must have demanded that the corporation bring 
the lawsuit itself, and the corporation refused.324 The refusal 
of the board of directors to institute a suit in the 
corporation’s name was essential and there had to be a clear 
default involving a breach of duty before a stockholder is 
  
 316. Id. at 283. 
 317. Id. at 302 (“It is thus apparent, that while the name of the corporation is 
thus used as a real party in the litigation, so far as the rights and interests of 
the complainants are concerned, it is an unreal and fictitious party . . . .”). 
 318. Id. 
 319. Memphis City v. Dean, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 64 (1868). 
 320. Id. at 66. 
 321. Id.  
 322. Id. at 66-67.  
 323. Id. at 67. 
 324. Id. at 73 (citing Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855)).  
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authorized to institute the suit in his own behalf.325 
Although the corporation refused to bring the lawsuit that 
Dean intended, the corporation argued that its previously 
filled complaint was substantially the same.326 The court 
dismissed the shareholder’s complaint, holding that the two 
actions were substantially similar and the corporation had 
not broken its trust to the stockholders.327  
In Davenport v. Dows,328 stockholders in the Chicago, 
Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad filed a bill to arrest the 
collection of a tax on the corporation by the city of 
Davenport.329 The Court held that a stockholder may bring a 
suit based on the rights of the corporation when the 
corporation refused to do so, as was the case here.330 
However, the shareholder had failed to make the 
corporation a defendant in the action.331 The court noted 
that “proceedings for this purpose should be so conducted 
that any decree which shall be made on the merits shall 
conclude the corporation. This can only be done by making 
the corporation a party defendant.”332 If the corporation 
were not made a party, the corporation might be able to 
bring a later lawsuit if the stockholder was unsuccessful.333 
To avoid this result, the court stated that it would not 
“settle a question in which the corporation is the essential 
party in interest, unless [the corporation] is made a party to 
the litigation” as a defendant.334 
  
 325. Id. (citing Dodge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 331); cf. City of Detroit v. Dean, 
106 U.S. 537, 541-42 (1883) (holding a stockholder seeking to protect the 
property of the corporation against a third party must show a clear breach of 
duty by the directors in neglecting or refusing to bring suit). 
 326. Memphis City, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 74. 
 327. Id. at 75-76. 
 328. Davenport v. Dows, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 626 (1873). 
 329. Id. at 626. 
 330. Id. at 627. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id.  
 333. Id. 
 334. Id.  
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In Hawes v. Oakland,335 the United States Supreme 
Court sought to establish limitations on a shareholder’s 
ability to bring derivative actions similar to the limitations 
the English court in Foss v. Harbottle had established.336 A 
stockholder in the Contra Costa Water-works Company 
filed suit on behalf of his interest in the corporation against 
the corporation and the city of Oakland for the corporation’s 
supply of free water to the city beyond the purposes 
prescribed in the charter.337 The plaintiff had urged the 
directors of the corporation to take immediate proceedings 
to prevent the city from taking water from the works of said 
company without compensation for any purpose other than 
those listed in the charter, but the directors had refused.338 
The court stated that the frequency of such suits by 
stockholders after Dodge v. Woolsey had “overburdened 
courts of the United States” by a “simulated and 
conventional arrangement.”339 The court explained that 
through this “arrangement,” shareholders essentially were 
colluding with their corporations to bring these suits in 
federal court, because the shareholder had the requisite 
citizenship for federal diversity jurisdiction that the 
corporation whose rights were to be enforced lacked.340 The 
court stated that Dodge v. Woolsey had not established a 
doctrine different than cases in English courts or other 
American courts, and the doctrine enabled a stockholder to 
bring an action only if one of the following exists:  
Some action or threatened action of the managing board of 
directors or trustees of the corporation which is beyond the 
authority conferred on them by their charter or other source of 
organization; 
Or such a fraudulent transaction completed or contemplated 
by the acting managers, in connection with some other party, or 
  
 335. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881). 
 336. Id. at 460 (citing Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch.); 2 Hare 
461).  
 337. Id. at 451. 
 338. Id.  
 339. Id. at 453.  
 340. Id. at 452-53. 
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among themselves, or with other shareholders as will result in 
serious injury to the corporation, or to the interests of the other 
shareholders; 
Or where the board of directors, or a majority of them, are 
acting for their own interest, in a manner destructive of the 
corporation itself, or of the rights of the other shareholders; 
Or where the majority of shareholders themselves are 
oppressively and illegally pursuing a course in the name of the 
corporation, which is in violation of the rights of other 
shareholders, and which can only be restrained by the aid of a 
court of equity.341 
However, “before the shareholder is permitted in his own 
name to institute . . . litigation”, he had to show that “he 
exhausted all means within his [control] to obtain the 
redress of his grievances.”342 The court held that the facts of 
Hawes presented “no such case,” because the plaintiff had 
merely requested “the directors to desist from furnishing 
water free of expense to the city” and had not exhausted all 
efforts to obtain the corporation’s action against the city.343 
III. UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORICAL AND NORMATIVE 
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN HISTORICAL AND MODERN 
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
The English Court of Chancery in the early 1800s 
applied the necessary parties rule and its exceptions to 
lawsuits that today would be called class actions and 
shareholder derivative actions, as Part I demonstrated. 
During that same time period, the courts of the newly 
established United States also followed the necessary 
parties rule and recognized an exception that permitted 
representative lawsuits for similar actions. However, as 
Part II explained, the U.S. courts limited when 
shareholders could bring actions, and the U.S. limitations 
always differed from the limitations imposed on similar 
actions in England. Now, Sections A and B below will 
  
 341. Id. at 460. 
 342. Id. at 460-61. 
 343. Id. at 461.  
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explain that the normative foundation of shareholder 
derivative litigation in the first 150 years of the United 
States varies dramatically from the modern version. Section 
C will then examine the likely explanations for the variance 
between early and modern shareholder derivative litigation, 
and it will suggest the implications that the normative 
foundation of early shareholder derivative actions may have 
on modern corporate law debates. 
A.  Shareholders May File an Action “On Behalf of All 
Shareholders” 
The shared history of class actions and shareholder 
derivative actions has long been overlooked, but that history 
reveals the early normative justifications for shareholder 
litigation. Both class actions and shareholder derivative 
actions are forms of representative litigation, meaning that 
one or a few persons stand for another or group of 
persons.344 Prior to Foss v. Harbottle in 1843, shareholders 
in English corporations and joint-stock companies were 
allowed to bring actions on behalf of all the shareholders 
with almost no limitations.345 Similar to class actions, these 
actions were permitted as an exception to the necessary 
parties rule. In Foss and subsequent cases, English courts 
limited shareholders to bringing suit only when an illegal or 
fraudulent act was alleged, or the wrong was committed by 
the majority shareholders against the minority 
shareholders.346  
During the 1800s and early 1900s, shareholders in U.S. 
companies were also permitted to bring lawsuits on behalf 
  
 344. See supra nn. 16-18 and accompanying text. 
 345. See, e.g., Adair v. New River Co., (1805) 32 Eng. Rep. 1153 (Ch.); 11 Ves. 
Jun. 429; Meux v. Maltby, (1818) 36 Eng. Rep. 621 (Ch.); 2 Swans 277; Hichens 
v. Congreve (1828) 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (Ch.); 4 Russ. 562; Preston v. Grand Collier 
Dock Co., (1840) 59 Eng. Rep. 900 (Vice Ch.); 11 Sim. 327; Wallworth v. Holt, 
(1841) 41 Eng. Rep. 238 (Ch.); 4 My. & Cr. 619. 
 346. See, e.g., Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 189 (Ch.) 202-04; 2 Hare 
461, 490-95; Atwool v. Merryweather, [1867] 5 L.R. Eq. 464, 465; Russell v. 
Wakefield Waterworks Co., [1875] 20 L.R. Eq. 474, 479-82. 
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of all the shareholders in certain circumstances.347 Thus, just 
like the plaintiff in a class action represented the other 
class members, the shareholder represented the other 
shareholders. Like class actions, these shareholder actions 
were also originally permitted as an exception to the 
necessary parties rule.348 Subsequent cases allowed 
shareholders in these lawsuits to bring them on behalf of 
themselves and the other shareholders when the 
shareholders were so numerous as to make it inconvenient 
to bring them all before the court.349 That formulation did 
not change until the late 1940s,350 when U.S. courts 
  
 347. See, e.g., Allen v. Curtis, 26 Conn. 456 (1857); Hersey v. Veazie, 24 Me. 9 
(1844); Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371; March v. E.R.R. Co., 40 N.H. 548 
(1860); Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1832); Hodges v. New 
England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312 (1850). 
 348. See Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829); Taylor v. Miami 
Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831). 
 349. See, e.g., Peabody v. Flint, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 52, 56 (1863); Robinson v. 
Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 232-33 (N.Y. Ch. 1832). Even today, U.S. courts use the 
language of the exceptions to the necessary parties rule in describing 
shareholder derivative actions. 
 The procedural requirements for derivative suits further protect 
the corporation and its stockholders by preventing a “multiplicity of 
lawsuits,” by limiting “who should properly speak for the corporation” 
and by precluding “self-selected advocate[s] pursuing individual gain 
rather than the interests of the corporation or the shareholders as a 
group, [from] bringing costly and potentially meritless strike suits.” A 
derivative lawsuit is thus the vehicle for a shareholder to litigate 
injuries that result in the diminution in value of the corporation’s stock.  
Rivers v. Wachovia Corp., 665 F.3d 610, 615 (4th Cir. 2011) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Norman v. Nash Johnson & Sons’ Farms, Inc., 537 S.E.2d 248, 
253 (N.C. App. 2000)). 
 350. Some earlier opinions had referred to shareholder derivative actions as 
being brought on behalf of the corporation. See, e.g., Beach v. Cooper, 13 P. 161, 
161 (Cal. 1887) (describing shareholder’s action as “brought on behalf of the 
corporation”); Glover v. Manila Gold Min. & Mill. Co., 104 N.W. 261, 264 (S.D. 
1905) (same); Just v. Idaho Canal & Improvement Co., 102 P. 381, 381 (Idaho 
1909) (same); Voorhees v. Mason, 91 N.E. 1056, 1060 (Ill. 1910) (same); Smith v. 
Stone, 128 P. 612, 620 (Wy. 1912) (same); Baillie v. Columbia Gold Mining Co. 
166 P. 965, 971 (Or. 1917) (same); Barthold v. Thomas, 210 S.W. 506, 507 (Tex. 
Comm’n. App. 1919) (same); Gipson v. Bedard, 217 N.W. 139, 140 (Minn. 1927) 
(same); Walsh v. Van Ameringen-Haebler, Inc., 248 N.Y.S. 1, 2 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1931) (same); Ames v. Am. Nat’l Bank of Portsmouth, 176 S.E. 204, 224 (Va. 
1934) (same). 
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routinely began to describe shareholder derivative lawsuits 
as being brought on behalf of the corporation but without 
any explanation for the change. Prior to the 1940s, courts 
typically referred to these lawsuits as brought by 
shareholders on behalf of all the shareholders.351 Courts had 
previously referred to these lawsuits as derivative,352 but 
often continued to state that the lawsuits were brought by 
shareholders on behalf of all the shareholders.353 In these 
  
 351. See, e.g., Davenport v. Dows, 85 U.S. 626, 627 (1873) (“[T]he individual 
shareholder is allowed to assert in behalf of himself and associates, because the 
directors of the corporation decline to take the proper steps to assert them.”); 
Nussbaum v. Nussbaum, 199 S.E. 169, 172 (Ga. 1938) (“The petition is what is 
sometimes called a stockholders’ derivative or representative suit, brought on 
behalf of the plaintiffs and other stockholders similarly situated . . . .”); 
McIlvaine v. City Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 19 N.E.2d 584, 584 (Ill. 1939) (“This is 
a representative suit in equity, instituted by the named plaintiffs on behalf of 
themselves and all other stockholders. . . to enforce a derivative cause of action 
in favor of the [company] . . . .”); Brady v. Meenan, 198 N.Y.S. 177, 177 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1923) (“This is a derivative action, brought by a stockholder of a 
corporation, on behalf of himself and other stockholders . . . .”); Pollitz v. 
Wabash R.R. Co., 100 N.E. 721, 722 (N.Y. 1912) (“The action is in behalf of the 
plaintiff and all other stockholders of the defendant company similarly situated 
against the company and five of its directors.”). 
 352. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939) (describing case as 
“stockholder’s derivative action”); Wales v. Jacobs, 104 F.2d 264, 267 (6th Cir. 
1939) (explaining that the case may not “be entertained as a stockholder’s 
derivative suit”); Wile v. Burns Bros., 2 F. Supp. 950, 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1932) 
(describing case as “stockholders’ derivative suit”); Nussbaum, 199 S.E. at 172 
(describing case as “stockholders’ derivative or representative suit”); Alexander 
v. Donohoe, 38 N.E. 263, 265 (N.Y. 1894) (“Suing as a stockholder, the plaintiff’s 
right of action is a derivative one. He sues, not primarily in his own rights, but 
in right of the corporation.”). 
 353. See, e.g, J.R.A. Corp. v. Boylan, 30 F. Supp. 393, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) 
(stating plaintiff “alleged a derivative stockholder’s suit in behalf of itself, and 
all other stockholders similarly situated, against” current and former directors 
of American Tobacco Company); Flynn v. Brooklyn City R.R. Co., 41 N.Y.S. 566, 
567 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896) (describing the shareholder’s right of action as 
“derivative from the corporation, and existing only by the failure of the 
corporation to assert its own right” and stating the lawsuit “is on behalf, not 
only of the particular plaintiff, but all the stockholders”); cf. In re Swofford Bros. 
Dry Goods Co., 180 F. 549, 552 (W.D. Mo. 1910) (describing the action as 
“prosecuted by the plaintiff on behalf of himself and the other stockholders of 
said corporation and on behalf of said corporation”); Wright v. Floyd, 86 N.E. 
971, 972 (Ind. App. 1909) ( “It is well settled that shareholders . . . may bring 
suit on behalf of the corporation to protect the interest of the corporation and 
incidentally the interest of the members . . . .”); Hingston v. Montgomery, 97 
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cases, the corporation was named as a defendant to prevent 
it from later bringing a duplicative action.354 By contrast, 
modern shareholder derivative actions are filed by 
shareholders on behalf of the corporation in both the United 
States355 and England.356  
This historical account of U.S. shareholder derivative 
lawsuits being brought on behalf of all the shareholders 
reveals a normative judgment that the shareholders had the 
right to seek remedy when the managers engaged in fraud 
or mismanagement. While acknowledging that a 
corporation was a separate legal entity and that normally 
the corporation was the proper party to bring suit against 
its managers for mismanagement or fraud, courts also 
recognized that corporate managers were not likely to sue 
themselves and permitted shareholders to bring suits in 
those circumstances.357 Therefore, courts recognized that it 
  
S.W. 202, 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 1906) (stating “stockholder may maintain an action 
against the corporation and the offending officers in his own name, though in 
reality on behalf of the corporation, and through it of all of its stockholders”). 
 354. See, e.g., Davenport, 85 U.S. at 627 (“[A] court of equity will not take 
cognizance of a bill brought to settle a question in which the corporation is the 
essential party in interest, unless it is made a party to the litigation.”); Smith v. 
Poor, 40 Me. 415, 422 (1855) (stating that “the corporation is a necessary party, 
either as complainants or defendants”); Alexander v. Quality Leather Goods 
Corp., 269 N.Y.S. 499, 503 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934) (stating when a shareholder 
brings an action “on behalf of other stockholders similarly situated, he exercises 
a derivative right and judgment must ordinarily be rendered in favor of the 
corporation, though the corporation be a defendant in the action.”). 
 355. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477 (1979) (“A derivative suit is 
brought by shareholders to enforce a claim on behalf of the corporation.”); Ross 
v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970); Rivers v. Wachovia Corp., 665 F.3d 610, 
614 (4th Cir. 2011) (stating a derivative action is “brought by a shareholder in 
the name or right of a corporation to redress an injury sustained by, or to 
enforce a duty owed to, the corporation’”) (quoting 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 5939-5940 (rev. ed. 
2011)).  
 356. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 § 260(1) (U.K.) (defining a derivative claim as 
a proceeding by a member of a company “(a) in respect of a cause of action 
vested in the company, (b) and seeking relief on behalf of the company”). 
 357. See, e.g., Fleer v. Frank H. Fleer Corp., 125 A. 411, 414 (Del. Ch. 1924) 
(“Where the demand if made would be directed to the particular individuals who 
themselves are the alleged wrongdoers and who therefore would be invited to 
sue themselves, the rule is settled that a demand and refusal is not requisite.”); 
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was the shareholders who were harmed in these 
circumstances and allowed the shareholders to pursue a 
lawsuit.  
Equity, at least, recognizes the truth that the stockholders are 
the proprietors of the corporate interests, and are ultimately the 
only beneficiaries thereof, and the remedies given the corporation 
are really, though indirectly, for the protection of their rights. They 
may at each authorized election entirely change the directorate 
and may at any time keep the directors within the line of faithful 
administration by an appeal to a court of equity or repudiate their 
acts which are intra vires of them, but voidable.358  
For this reason, early shareholder derivative litigation 
struck a balance of power between the board and the 
shareholders. The board of directors could be held 
accountable by shareholders other than through elections, 
and the board was not the sole power controlling the 
corporation. Importantly, other stakeholders (such as 
employees or customers) were not given this right to pursue 
litigation, only the shareholders. The historical and 
normative foundation of early shareholder derivative 
litigation in the United States bolsters the shareholder 
primacy theory and may prove valuable to its advocates. 
The shift to shareholder derivative actions brought on 
behalf of the corporation that took hold in the late 1940s 
through today reveals a different normative judgment. That 
a different normative foundation underlies the modern 
shareholder derivative action can also be seen in the 
increasingly narrow circumstances in which shareholders 
are permitted to pursue such litigation. 
  
Orlando Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 144 So. 674, 678 (Fla. 1932) (“Under the 
showing made by the bill in the instant case, a request that the directors sue 
themselves would have been fruitless.”); Estel v. Midgard Inv. Co., 46 S.W.2d 
193, 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932) (“The wrongs complained of are charged against 
the directors themselves, who are in control of the assets and business of the 
corporation. The wrongdoers could hardly be expected to sue themselves.”). 
 358. Pollitz v. Wabash R.R. Co., 100 N.E. 721, 725 (N.Y. 1912) (emphasis 
added). 
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B.  Shareholders May File an Action in Limited 
Circumstances 
To prevent abuse, courts in the United States imposed 
limits on when shareholders could seek redress through 
litigation. Although some early U.S. lawsuits by 
shareholders claiming mismanagement or fraudulent 
conduct by directors and officers did not appear to limit 
when such suits could be pursued,359 the first decisions of 
the New York Chancery Court did impose limitations. The 
New York Chancery Court held that if the corporation 
refused to prosecute or was still under the control of the 
defendants, then shareholders were permitted to file a bill 
in their own names and on behalf of all the shareholders, 
with the corporation being made a defendant.360 Subsequent 
court decisions in other states similarly limited shareholder 
lawsuits to instances where the corporation was incapable 
of seeking redress or improperly refused to seek redress.361  
This historical limitation on shareholder derivative 
actions reveals a normative judgment, as did its procedural 
nature of being brought on behalf of all the shareholders. 
Limiting derivative actions to instances in which the 
corporation refused or was unable to seek redress itself 
allowed shareholder lawsuits essentially on one topic: 
misconduct by the corporation’s directors or officers.362 
Shareholders had the right to seek remedy when these 
managers engaged in fraud or mismanagement.363 “Devised 
as a suit in equity, the purpose of the derivative action was   
 359. See, e.g., Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829); Taylor v. Miami 
Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162 (1831); Putnam v. Sweet, 2 Pin. 302 (Wis. 1849). 
 360. See, e.g., Forbes v. Witlock, 3 Edw. Ch. 446, 448 (N.Y. Ch. 1840); 
Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 233 (N.Y. Ch. 1832). 
 361. See, e.g., March v. E. R.R. Co., 40 N.H. 548, 567-68 (1860); Allen v. Curtis, 
26 Conn. 456, 461-62 (1857); Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312, 340-
41 (1850); Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 371, 377-78 (1847); Hersey v. 
Veazie, 24 Me. 9, 12-13 (1844). 
 362. Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95-97 (1991) (stating that 
“[t]he derivative form of action permits an individual shareholder to bring ‘suit 
to enforce a corporate cause of action against officers, directors, and third 
parties’”) (quoting Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534 (1970)). 
 363. See id. 
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to place in the hands of the individual shareholder a means 
to protect the interests of the corporation from the 
misfeasance and malfeasance of ‘faithless directors and 
managers.’”364 Even though a corporation was a separate 
legal entity that should bring suit against its managers for 
mismanagement or fraud, courts recognized that corporate 
managers were the ones making the corporation’s decisions, 
and they were not likely to sue themselves.365 For this 
reason, courts in equity permitted shareholders to bring 
suits in those circumstances and gave shareholders the 
power to hold directors accountable through litigation. 
Again, recognizing that it was the shareholders who were 
harmed, courts’ decisions to allow such litigation reflected a 
balance of power between the board and the shareholders. 
This normative foundation of early shareholder derivative 
litigation in the United States further bolsters the 
shareholder primacy theory. 
Modern courts also limit when shareholders can pursue 
litigation for misconduct by corporate officers and directors, 
but the limitation started becoming much stricter with the 
shift to derivative actions being recognized as on behalf of 
the corporation. The U.S. Supreme Court in 1946 described 
shareholder derivative suits as a remedy “for those 
situations where the management through fraud, neglect of 
duty or other cause declines to take the proper and 
necessary steps to assert the rights which the corporation 
has.”366 Today the limitation is typically a precondition “for 
the suit,” requiring the shareholder to demonstrate “that 
the corporation itself had refused to proceed after suitable 
demand, unless excused by extraordinary conditions.”367 
Because the board of directors possesses the statutory 
authority to manage the corporation and its assets, 
including a cause of action,368 federal courts and most state   
 364. Id. at 95 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 
548 (1949)). 
 365. See supra n. 357 and accompanying text. 
 366. Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161, 167 (1946). 
 367. Ross, 396 U.S. at 534. 
 368. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
8.01(b) (2010). 
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courts today permit a shareholder to file a derivative action 
only after making demand on the board to rectify the 
challenged transaction.369 The board could choose to 
prosecute the litigation itself in response to the demand, but 
typically the board rejects the demand.370  
To pursue a derivative action after a demand has been 
rejected, the shareholder must demonstrate to the court 
that the demand was wrongfully rejected.371 In some states, 
the shareholder can forego making a demand and argue 
that demand should be excused.372 To establish either that a 
demand was wrongfully rejected by the board or that 
demand should be excused, the plaintiff essentially must 
show that the business judgment rule does not apply to the 
board’s decision.373 The business judgment rule is a defense 
that presumes directors acted in a manner consistent with 
  
 369. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(b)(3) (“The complaint must be verified and 
must . . . state with particularity: (A) any effort by the plaintiff to obtain the 
desired action from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from 
the shareholders or members; and (B) the reasons for not obtaining the action or 
not making the effort.”); DEL. CH. R. 23.1(a) (“The complaint shall also allege 
with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action 
the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons 
for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.”); 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 (“No shareholder may commence a derivative 
proceeding until: (1) a written demand has been made upon the corporation to 
take suitable action; and (2) 90 days have expired from the date delivery of the 
demand was made unless the shareholder has earlier been notified that the 
demand has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable injury to the 
corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90-day period.”). 
 370. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 19, § 8.5, at 395; see also Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare 
the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through 
Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 408 (2005) (noting “most boards” decide 
“not to bring any action” and “most courts defer to boards on this matter”). 
 371. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1216, 1219 (Del. 1996); BAINBRIDGE, 
supra note 19, § 8.5, at 395. 
 372. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984) (stating that demand 
is excused when officers and directors are under influences that impede their 
discretion to act on behalf of the corporation). The MBCA, however, states a 
universal demand requirement. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42. 
 373. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813-14; see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 19, § 8.5, at 
395.  
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their fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, and good faith.374 
Therefore, to show that the directors wrongfully rejected 
demand, the plaintiff must establish that a majority of the 
directors breached one of their fiduciary duties.375 The 
application is similar for cases in which the plaintiff seeks 
demand excusal: the plaintiff must establish that a majority 
of directors were financially interested or not independent 
in making the challenged decision.376 In other words, a trial 
court will excuse demand when the board is disabled by a 
conflict of interest, because the judge may presume the 
directors will not sue themselves. For example, Delaware 
excuses demand if the plaintiff can allege particularized 
facts creating reasonable doubt that (1) a majority of the 
board has a material interest in the challenged transaction; 
(2) a majority of the board lacks independence; or (3) the 
challenged transition is not the product of a valid exercise of 
business judgment.377 New York will excuse demand if the 
plaintiff can allege with particularity that (1) a majority of 
directors are interested in the transaction; (2) the directors 
failed to inform themselves; or (3) the challenged 
transaction is so egregious that it could not have been the 
product of sound judgment.378  
  
 374. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. The United Kingdom has never recognized a 
judicially-created business judgment rule defense similar to that in U.S. law, 
although English judges are reluctant to second-guess directors’ decisions. 
Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 232(1) (U.K.) (“Any provision that purports to 
exempt a director of a company (to any extent) from any liability that would 
otherwise attach to him in connection with any negligence, default, breach of 
duty or breach of trust in relation to the company is void.”); Cheffins & Black, 
supra note 137, at 1401. 
 375. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 (“Moreover, where demand on a board has 
been made and refused, we apply the business judgment rule in reviewing the 
board’s refusal to act pursuant to a stockholder’s demand.”); see also Beneville v. 
York, 769 A.2d 80, 85 n.9 (Del. Ch. 2000) (noting that in the case of a board with 
only two directors, business judgment rule protection is unavailable because the 
interested director can block the action of the impartial director).  
 376. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814-15. 
 377. Id. at 812-14; Beneville, 769 A.2d at 85 n.9. 
 378. Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1040-41 (N.Y. 1996). 
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However, a majority of states have adopted the Model 
Business Corporation Act (MBCA),379 which was originally 
drafted in 1950.380 It requires demand to be made in all 
cases, so no excusal of demand is possible.381 The MBCA 
therefore limits shareholder derivative litigation more than 
the common law standards of states such as Delaware and 
New York, which permit demand excusal.382 After the board 
rejects a shareholder’s demand, the MBCA requires the 
shareholder to allege with particularity facts establishing 
that a majority of the board of directors did not consist of 
qualified directors at the time the determination to reject 
the demand was made.383 The MBCA defines a qualified 
director for this purpose as one who does not have “(i) a 
material interest in the outcome of the proceeding, or (ii) a 
material relationship with a person who has such an 
interest.”384 Compared to the discretion provided to judges 
through the third elements of the demand excusal 
standards of Delaware and New York, the MBCA imposes a 
much stricter limitation for shareholders wanting to pursue 
derivative litigation.  
Both the common law and the MBCA formulations of 
the modern limitations on shareholder derivative actions 
are far tougher than the limitation expressed in cases in the 
1800s. The courts in those cases phrased the limitation in 
terms of whether a corporation had been found incapable of 
seeking redress or improperly refused to do so.385 Later cases 
expanded on the former scenario by focusing on whether the 
corporation was still under the control of those who would 
  
 379. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, at v, ix (2010); LINDA O. SMIDDY & LAWRENCE A. 
CUNNINGHAM, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES, 
MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 231 (7th ed. 2010). 
 380. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT, at v, ix. 
 381. Id. § 7.42. 
 382. See supra nn. 376-77 and accompanying text. 
 383. Id. § 7.44(c). 
 384. Id. § 1.43(a)(1). 
 385. See, e.g., Bronson v. La Crosse & Milwaukie R.R. Co., 69 U.S. 283, 302 
(1864); Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331, 335 (1855); Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 
Met.) 371, 377-78 (1847); Smith v. Poor, 40 Me. 415, 422 (1855); Hersey v. 
Veazie, 24 Me. 9, 12-13 (1844). 
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be defendants in the lawsuit.386 For instance, consider 
Robinson v. Smith’s 1832 formulation: 
Generally, where there has been a waste or misapplication of the 
corporate funds, by the officers or agents of the company, a suit to 
compel them to account for such waste or misapplication should 
be in the name of the corporation. But as this court never permits 
a wrong to go unredressed merely for the sake of form, if it 
appeared that the directors of the corporation refused to prosecute 
by collusion with those who had made themselves answerable by 
their negligence or fraud, or if the corporation was still under the 
control of those who must be made the defendants in the suit, the 
stockholders, who are the real parties in interest, would be 
permitted to file a bill in their own names, making the corporation 
a party defendant. And if the stockholders were so numerous as to 
render it impossible, or very inconvenient to bring them all before 
the court, a part might file a bill, in behalf of themselves and all 
others standing in the same situation.387 
These broader statements of when shareholder derivative 
lawsuits could be pursued continued through the early 
1900s.388 The modern formulations are more limiting for 
shareholders wanting to pursue shareholder derivative 
litigation and thereby reflect a decrease in shareholder 
power. 
To some extent, the modern limitations on when a 
shareholder derivative lawsuit may be brought, particularly 
the business judgment rule defense as applied to demand 
  
 386. Brewer v. Boston Theatre, 104 Mass. 378, 387 (1870); Peabody v. Flint, 88 
Mass. (6 Allen) 52, 56 (1863). 
 387. Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 233 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) (emphasis 
added). 
 388. See, e.g., McKee v. Rogers, 156 A. 191, 193 (Del. Ch. 1931) (holding that 
where a defendant controlled the board of directors, “[i]t is manifest then that 
there can be no expectation that the corporation would sue him, and, if it did, it 
can hardly be said that the prosecution of the suit would be entrusted to proper 
hands”); Miller v. Loft, Inc., 153 A. 861, 862 (Del. Ch. 1931) (stating “if by reason 
of hostile interest or guilty participation in the wrongs complained of, the 
directors cannot be expected to institute suit. . . no demand upon them to 
institute suit is requisite”); Fleer v. Frank H. Fleer Corp., 125 A. 411, 414 (Del. 
Ch. 1924) (“Where the demand if made would be directed to the particular 
individuals who themselves are the alleged wrongdoers and who therefore 
would be invited to sue themselves, the rule is settled that a demand and 
refusal is not requisite.”). 
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excusal and wrongful rejection of demand determinations, 
reflect judges’ reluctance to second-guess directors’ 
decisions. In many early shareholder cases, courts 
expressed concern about adopting a standard of liability 
that would render corporate managers liable whenever loss 
resulted from their actions. For instance, the opinion in 
Percy v. Millaudon may have stated a precursor to the 
modern business judgment rule when it expressed concern 
about imposing liability whenever loss ensues from 
directors’ decisions.389 It stated that “[t]he test of 
responsibility, therefore, should be, not the certainty of 
wisdom in others, but the possession of ordinary knowledge; 
and by showing that the error of the agent is of so gross a 
kind that a man of common sense, and ordinary attention, 
would not have fallen into it.”390 In 1847, in Godbold v. 
Branch Bank at Mobile, the Alabama Supreme Court 
espoused a similar concern about holding directors to 
“extreme accuracy of knowledge,” particularly when a large 
degree of discretion is necessarily entrusted to them.391 “The 
inevitable tendency of such a rule, would be hostile to the 
end proposed by it, as no man of ordinary prudence would 
[accept] a trust surrounded by such perils.”392 In Hodges v. 
New England Screw Co., the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
in 1853 also stated a version of deference to the directors: 
“We think a Board of Directors acting in good faith and with 
reasonable care and diligence, who nevertheless fall into a 
mistake, either as to law or fact, are not liable for the 
consequences of such mistake.”393 In Spering’s Appeal,394 the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1872 stated that directors 
  
 389. Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 77-78 (La. 1829) (“[T]he adoption of 
a course from which loss ensues cannot make the agent responsible, if the error 
was one into which a prudent man might have fallen. The contrary doctrine 
seems to us to suppose the possession, and require the exercise of perfect 
wisdom in fallible beings. No man would undertake to render a service to 
another on such severe conditions.”). 
 390. Id. at 78. 
 391. Godbold v. Branch Bank at Mobile, 11 Ala. 191, 199 (1847). 
 392. Id. 
 393. Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 3 R.I. 9, 18 (1853). 
 394. 71 Pa. 11 (1872). 
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“are not liable for mistakes of judgment, even though they 
may be so gross as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous, 
provided they are honest and provided they are fairly within 
the scope of the powers and discretion confided to the 
managing body.”395 However, all such statements during 
this period were made by courts as they decided whether 
the directors were liable for their actions. The courts were 
not deciding whether the shareholder’s lawsuit may 
proceed, as that decision had already been made. Thus, the 
modern standard for determining when a shareholder 
derivative lawsuit may be pursued differs significantly from 
the historical inquiry. This shift also significantly 
diminishes shareholders’ power and reflects an alteration in 
the normative judgment underlying shareholder derivative 
litigation. 
C.  Possible Explanations for the Shift in Shareholder 
Derivative Litigation’s Normative Foundation 
The shift in the normative foundation of shareholder 
derivative litigation occurred in the late 1940s with courts 
regularly recognizing shareholder derivative lawsuits as 
being brought on behalf of the corporation. It can also be 
seen through modern courts’ adoption of ever stricter 
limitations on when shareholders can pursue derivative 
litigation. The obvious question is: why did this shift occur? 
Did something in the nature of the corporation change, such 
as new state legislation that altered the terms by which 
corporations were created and governed? Or was it 
something else? 
1. The Evolution of Corporations in the United States. In 
colonial times, corporations were created by royal charters 
  
 395. Id. at 24; see also Watts’s Appeal, 78 Pa. 370, 392 (1875) (“[D]irectors are 
mandatories only, and as such, held to but ordinary skill and diligence, and are 
not responsible to their fellow corporators for the want of judgment and 
knowledge. They are personally liable only where they are guilty of fraudulent 
conduct or of acts clearly ultra vires.”); Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 23 A. 405, 415 
(Pa. 1892) (stating “directors, who are gratuitous mandatories, are only liable 
for fraud, or for such gross negligence as amounts to fraud”). 
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just as they were in England,396 and only local public service 
corporations were well represented.397 After winning 
independence from England in the American Revolution, 
the United States attained the sovereign power to 
incorporate its own corporations, which allowed for business 
enterprises to obtain the privileges of limited liability and 
conditions of a more stable organization.398 Although 
Congress has the power to charter corporations, it has 
rarely done so.399 Instead, most U.S. corporations are 
created under state law.400  
In early U.S. history, very few business corporations 
were chartered compared to the staggering numbers that 
exist today because “small-scale enterprise was still the 
order of the day.”401 However, by 1800 no less than 310 
business corporations of various types had been created.402 
  
 396. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 448 (1793) (“A corporation is a mere 
creature of the King, or of Parliament; very rarely of the latter; most usually of 
the former only. It owes its existence, its name, and its laws, (except such laws 
as are necessarily incident to all corporations merely as such) to the authority 
which create[s] it.”). 
 397. JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATIONS 5 (1917); see also EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS 
CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 6 (1954); BERLE & MEANS, supra note 13, at 11 
(noting that of the 335 corporations existing in 1800, 219 were turnpike, bridge, 
and canal companies; another thirty-six were water, fire protection, and 
wharfage companies; while sixty-seven were banks and insurance companies; 
and six were engaged in manufacturing). 
 398. DAVIS, supra note 397, at 6-7; see also E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Statutory 
Developments in Business Corporation Law, 1886-1936, 50 HARV. L. REV. 27, 28 
(1936). For the survival of the legal status of corporate charters created under 
English law, see Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 551-56, 
621-23 (1819) and Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 97-104 (1810).  
 399. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 418-24 (1819) (holding the 
Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause gave Congress the power to create a 
national bank). The United States has federally chartered 90-plus corporations 
over time including the Federal Reserve Banks, Federal Home Loan Banks, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 20101-240101. 
 400. DODD, supra note 397, at 2. 
 401. DAVIS, supra note 397. 
 402. DODD, supra note 397, at 11; see also BERLE & MEANS, supra note 13, at 11 
(stating that only 335 profit-seeking corporations were organized in the United 
States until 1800, and nearly all of them were organized in the 1890s); DAVIS, 
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This number increased in the early 1800s, and “by 1830 the 
New England states alone had created nearly 1900 business 
corporations.”403 For many decades in American history, “the 
almost universal practice was [for the state legislature] to 
embody the charter of each corporation in a special act.”404 A 
special legislative act created a single particular 
corporation, whereas a general corporate statute allowed 
incorporation by complying with prescribed conditions.405 
Despite the fact that for many years the privilege of 
incorporation was available only by obtaining a special act 
of incorporation from the state legislature, it was typically 
granted.406 However, as the 19th century progressed, 
incorporation through special act came under fire because it 
produced opportunities for corruption.407 
General corporate statutes eliminated the need to 
specially legislate upon applications of incorporation and 
  
supra note 397, at 23-25; Harwell Wells, The Rise of the Close Corporation and 
the Making of Corporation Law, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 263, 278 (2008) (noting 
that these early corporations typically provided some public service). 
 403. DODD, supra note 397, at 11. Early judicial decisions recognized the 
irrevocable nature of the corporate charter. Douglas Arner, Development of the 
American Law of Corporations to 1832, 55 SMU L. REV. 23, 53 (2002) (citing 
Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819)). 
 404. DODD, supra note 397, at 197. Before 1811, general acts had been present 
but were only applied to certain categories of corporations, such as those for 
religious purposes. See DAVIS, supra note 397, at 16-18. 
 405. 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 2:3 (3d ed. 2012). 
 406. Dodd, supra note 397, at 28. 
 407. See id.; see also Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting in part) (“The desire for business expansion [in the 
early 1800s] created an irresistible demand for more charters; and it was 
believed that under general laws embodying safeguards of universal application 
the scandals and favoritism incident to special incorporation could be avoided.”); 
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON 336-37 (1953) (noting that 
state legislators were often hesitant to move to a general incorporation statute, 
because they would no longer be able to receive bribes for special incorporation 
acts); Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business 
Relationship in the United States: Colonial Times to Present, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 
553, 589 (1994) (noting general incorporation statutes were meant to change the 
monopolistic nature of special acts and return to the concept of equality of 
opportunity). 
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produced equality of opportunity that led to the 
establishment of a larger variety of corporations.408 The first 
general incorporation act was established in New York’s Act 
of 1811.409 However, it was limited to manufacturing 
businesses, and the incorporation was limited to 20 years 
with capital not to exceed $100,000.410 Connecticut in 1837 
adopted a general corporation statute that allowed for the 
incorporation of any corporation engaged in “lawful 
business.”411 “[By] the outbreak of the Civil War, general 
acts for the incorporation of manufacturing and . . . some 
other common types of business corporations had been 
adopted by most . . . states.”412  
Although general incorporation acts were customary 
after the Civil War,413 restrictions on corporations, such as 
limits on size and scope of corporate activity, remained 
common until approximately 1890 due to an attitude of 
suspicion and fear toward the corporate mechanism.414 
Given the restrictive nature of the general incorporation 
laws, many companies still preferred to seek special 
legislative acts for incorporation to attain greater privileges, 
and legislators liked the ability to directly influence 
  
 408. DODD, supra note 397, at 316; see also Louis K. Liggett, 288 U.S. at 548-49 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting in part) (noting that general incorporation laws “were, 
in part, an expression of the desire for equality of opportunity”). However, some 
criticized general laws as a departure from the “true principle upon which an act 
of incorporation should ever be granted,” that of public utility. DODD, supra note 
397, at 316. 
 409. COX & HAZEN, supra note 405, § 2:4. 
 410. Id. 
 411. SMIDDY & CUNNINGHAM, supra note 379, at 229. 
 412. Dodd, supra note 397, at 28.  
 413. SCHLESINGER, supra note 407, at 337. 
 414. FLETCHER, supra note 387, § 2; Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 
548-49 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part) (explaining that incorporation 
for business purposes was commonly denied because of fear: “Fear of the 
subjection of labor to capital. Fear of monopoly. Fear that the absorption of 
capital by corporations, and their perpetual life, might bring evils similar to 
those which attended mortmain. There was a sense of some insidious menace 
inherent in large aggregations of capital, particularly when held by 
corporations.”). 
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business activity.415 However, by the end of the 19th 
century, most states had added a prohibition against special 
charters to their constitutions and eliminated restrictions 
on corporate formation and operation.416 In 1855, 
Massachusetts enacted the first general law to authorize 
the carrying on of business outside of the state that 
incorporated the company.417 In 1896, New Jersey enacted 
what may be regarded as the first permissive modern 
incorporation act that conferred broad powers on 
corporations, by removing restrictions on capital and 
duration and allowing three or more persons to become a 
corporation for “any lawful purpose or purposes whatever, 
other than a savings bank, a building and loan association, 
[and] an insurance company.”418 Although New Jersey was 
the first to enact such a permissive incorporation statute, 
Delaware later enacted a nearly identical statute. When 
New Jersey revised its statute in 1913 to make it more 
restrictive, Delaware became the leader in incorporation 
and remains the preeminent state for incorporation today.419  
So the shift in the normative foundation of shareholder 
derivative litigation that occurred in the late 1940s cannot 
be explained by the transition to general incorporation 
  
 415. Robert M. Ireland, The Problem of Local, Private, and Special Legislation 
in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 271, 281 (2004) 
(“Although a number of states enacted general laws of incorporation by the mid-
nineteenth century, often these laws were not mandatory, and the influential 
usually avoided them and continued to secure special acts of incorporation that 
granted them powers and privileges not available through the general 
incorporation statute.”); Walter Werner, Corporation Law in Search of Its 
Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1611, 1618 (1981) (stating that “charters often 
continued to be granted by special act even when available under general 
incorporation statutes” and that special acts “allowed legislatures to relieve 
entrepreneurs from the uniform standards of the general statutes”).  
 416. Louis K. Liggett Co., 288 U.S. at 549 n.4; see also id. at 549 n.3 (stating 
that New York in 1822, Delaware in 1831, Illinois in 1848, and Wisconsin in 
1848 passed constitutional amendments requiring a legislative supermajority 
vote or ratification by popular vote of any bill creating or renewing a corporate 
charter); COX & HAZEN, supra note 405, § 2:4. 
 417. DODD, supra note 397, at 324. 
 418. JOHN J. TREACY & JOHN MILTON, THE GENERAL CORPORATION ACT OF NEW 
JERSEY 5, 8 (1921). 
 419. COX & HAZEN, supra note 405, § 2:4.  
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statutes nor the removal of restrictions on corporations, 
because those occurred in the late 1800s to early 1900s. 
Furthermore, the growth of the modern public corporation 
alone also cannot explain this shift. Public corporations did 
not reach full maturity, as known today, until the early 
1900s.420 The spread of general corporate laws and the 
removal of restrictions on corporations were crucial to the 
growth of public corporations.421 In combination, these 
changes allowed public corporations to assemble the capital 
necessary to expand and the permanence demanded by 
long-term investors.422 However, public corporations existed 
long before the late 1940s, as evidenced by the stock market 
crash of 1929 and the passage of new federal securities laws 
to govern public corporations in 1933 and 1934.423  
2. Perceptions of Corporations and Derivative Litigation. 
The rise of public corporations alone may not explain the 
normative shift in shareholder derivative litigation, but 
public corporations did cause changes in the perception of 
corporations and subsequently shareholder derivative 
litigation. Scholarly writing on the issue of corporate 
purpose grew during the 1930s and 1940s. In 1932, 
Professor Adolf Berle advanced the shareholder primacy 
theory, arguing that “all powers granted to a corporation or 
  
 420. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 13, at 14; Skeel, supra note 15, at 169-70 
(noting that shareholders in the United States have been widely dispersed since 
the beginning of the twentieth century). Some companies had wider ownership 
such as early New England textile companies and the New York Central 
Railroad (NYCR). The NYCR, created in 1853 from consolidation of shortline 
rail companies, was a public company of nearly 2,500 investors without a 
controlling person. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 13, at 11-13 & n.3. Similar 
corporate ownership patterns can be seen in other entities in the last half of the 
1800s in areas such as public utilities and general manufacturing. See id. at 14. 
 421. See Ballam, supra note 407, at 589. 
 422. See Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Who Bears the Costs of Lawyers’ 
Mistakes?—Against Limited Liability, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 885, 901 (2004) (noting 
the benefits of general incorporation statutes for shareholders included “limited 
liability, free transferability of shares, passive equity ownership, agency 
efficiencies, and perpetual jural existence of corporations”). 
 423. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z-3); Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, Pub. L. No. 73–291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a-78pp). 
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to the management of a corporation . . . [are] at all times 
exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the 
shareholders.”424 In the same year, Professor Merrick Dodd 
advanced the stakeholder theory, arguing that the proper 
purpose of a public corporation included not only making 
money for shareholders, but also included providing secure 
jobs to its employees, quality products for its customers, and 
other benefits for society as a whole.425 This debate about 
corporate purpose has been well chronicled, and the 
stakeholder or managerialist theory won the argument for 
several decades, until the shareholder primacy theory 
gained the upper hand in the 1970s.426 Given the timing of 
this debate about corporate purpose, it appears to have 
influenced both courts and legislatures to change their 
perspective of shareholder derivative litigation.  
A 1944 study of shareholder derivative litigation 
commissioned by business leaders in New York427 may also 
have influenced that change of perspective. The Wood 
Report examined 1,266 lawsuits filed by shareholders in two 
New York counties and one federal district court in New 
York from 1932 to 1942.428 Although 693 of the cases 
involved closely held corporations, the study focused on the 
573 public corporation cases.429 The report criticized the 
frequency of shareholder suits filed by small investors and 
concluded that these investors were essentially pawns for 
the plaintiff’s attorneys, who were the true beneficiaries of 
such derivative lawsuits.430 The report also noted that the 
corporation ultimately bears the costs of both sides in such 
litigation, because it must pay the plaintiff’s attorneys their 
fees if the suit provided a benefit to the corporation and it 
  
 424. Berle, supra note 3, at 1049. 
 425. Dodd, supra note 12 at 1146-48. 
 426. STOUT, supra note 8, at 16-23. 
 427. FRANKLIN S. WOOD, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF N. Y. STATE, SURVEY AND 
REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS’ DERIVATIVE SUITS (1944). 
 428. Id. at 6-7. 
 429. Id. 
 430. Id. at 16-21. 
906 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
usually must indemnify the fees of the directors.431 The 
report’s proposed solution was to limit standing to 
shareholders owning stock at the time of the alleged wrong 
and to require plaintiffs owning small amounts of stock to 
post a bond to secure the defendants’ expenses if the suit 
was found to be without merit.432 The New York legislature 
enacted the first security for expenses statute a month 
later, requiring the plaintiff to post a bond unless he owned 
“at least 5% or $50,000 of [the corporation’s] stock.”433 
However, over time, this restriction was eased by allowing 
shareholders to band together to meet the ownership 
requirement.  
It is not surprising that corporate directors and officers 
dislike the shareholder derivative device; it permits 
shareholders to challenge their decisions. The Wood Report 
gave directors and officers a basis for arguing to legislatures 
and courts that shareholder derivative litigation needed to 
be restrained. When the 1944 Wood Report is combined 
with the academic debate over corporate purpose in which 
the stakeholder or managerialist view had prevailed by the 
1940s, the changed perception of the corporation is the most 
likely explanation for the normative shift in shareholder 
derivative litigation.  
CONCLUSION 
For the first 150 years of the United States, courts 
permitted shareholders to bring a lawsuit on behalf of all 
the shareholders, but limited when shareholders could bring 
such actions to instances where the corporation was 
incapable of seeking redress or improperly refused to seek 
redress. This historical account reveals a normative 
judgment that shareholders, as a group, had the right to   
 431. Id. 
 432. Id. at 21-25. 
 433. Skeel, supra note 15, at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Ch. 668, §61-b, 1944 N.Y. Laws 1455); see also 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
1835, at 164 n.1 (3d ed. 2007) (listing Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, 
Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin as states 
adopting security for expenses statutes). 
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seek remedy when the managers engaged in fraud or 
mismanagement. While acknowledging a corporation was a 
separate legal entity that normally was the proper party to 
bring suit against its managers for mismanagement or 
fraud, courts recognized that corporate managers controlled 
the corporation’s decision to sue and were not likely to sue 
themselves. For this reason, courts of equity permitted 
shareholders to bring suits in those circumstances on behalf 
of all shareholders. Thus, recognizing that it was the 
shareholders who were harmed, courts’ choice to allow 
litigation reflected a balance of power between the board 
and the shareholders. The board of directors could be held 
accountable by shareholders other than through elections, 
and the board was not the sole power controlling the 
corporation. Notably, other stakeholders such as employees 
were not given this right to pursue litigation, only 
shareholders. The historical and normative foundation of 
shareholder derivative litigation in the United States 
bolsters the shareholder primacy theory and may prove 
valuable to its advocates. 
At the same time, other scholars could focus on the 
reasons for the normative shift and suggest corresponding 
changes to the structure of shareholder derivative litigation. 
Today shareholders may bring a derivative lawsuit on 
behalf of the corporation and only within much narrower 
circumstances. This modern shareholder derivative action 
reflects the theory that the corporation is an entity unto 
itself. Shareholders’ role in the corporation through modern 
shareholder derivative litigation has been markedly 
diminished. This shift was driven by a change in the 
perception of public corporations, but nothing in the 
fundamental nature of the corporation changed because the 
state laws creating corporations did not change. State 
statutes always gave the board of directors the power to 
make the corporation’s decisions. Yet courts, and later those 
legislatures adopting the MBCA, altered the balance of 
power between boards of directors and shareholders that 
had existed for 150 years through shareholder derivative 
litigation. While these changes were driven by the 
perception of public corporations, the shareholder derivative 
action was altered for all corporations, both public and 
private. Perhaps it is time to rethink shareholder derivative 
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litigation in relation to the nature of corporations and their 
purposes. 
